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BUSINESS DECISIONS BY THE NEW BOARD: 
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AND 
CORPORATE LAWt 
Robert J. Haft** 
Not long ago, the boards of directors of large American corpora-
tions1 generally rubber-stamped the decisions of top management.2 
As lower-rank offi~rs or business associates of the corporation, most 
directors were beholden to one "director," the chief executive officer. 
The board rendered friendly advice to the chief executive and :fired 
him if he performed very poorly.3 Almost invariably, however, the 
chief executive dominated the old board. This pattern of subservi-
ence has recently begun to give way. ''Independent" or nonmanage-
ment directors now constitute a majority of the typical board of the 
1,300 largest corporations in the United States.4 Along with this in-
dependence has come an unmistakable trend toward increasing the 
t Copyright © 1981 by Robert J. Haft. 
• Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.A. 1952, C.C.N.Y.; 
LL.B. 1954, Columbia Law School - Ed. 
:j: The author wishes to acknowledge the very helpful assistance of Michael J. Cromwell 
Ill, J.D. 1981, Georgetown University Law Center. 
1. This Article deals with only the very largest American corporations. The cut very 
roughly includes companies with over $150 million in assets or $1 billion in annual sales, with 
publicly traded common stock. This comprises, in the corporate statistical data later cited, no 
less than the "Fortune 500," nor more than the 1,300 largest corporations. Most of the analysis 
in this A!ticle is premised on the existence of a board consisting of a majority of independent 
directors, which these companies have recently achieved, and part of the analysis is based 
upon corporate organizations with virtually autonomous divisions, usually a function of opera-
tions which are very large in si?.e and complex. The other large- and medium-sized publicly 
held corporations may not have a majority of independent directors or autonomous divisions 
in the foreseeable future. 
2. One president has said, ''We get a little advice from the outside board members, but the 
management runs the company. The board rubber-stamps the action of the management, and 
the board members are there to mollify the outside stockholders." Mace, Tlte President and tlte 
Board of .Directors, HAR.v. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1972, at 37, 39. Accord, R. GORDON, BUSI-
NESS LEADERSHIP IN THE LAROE CoRPORATION 131 (1945) ("For the majority of the corpora-
tions studied, the available evidence strongly suggests that ratification of management 
proposals by the board is largely a formality."). But see End of tlte .Directors' Rubber Stamp, 
Bus. WEEK, Sept. 10, 1979, at 72 (noting a greater willingness by directors to challenge man-
agement policies). 
3. See M. MAcE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 15 (1971); Mace, supra note 2, at 37-
41; Mace, .Directors: Mytlt and Reality- Ten Years Later, 32 RUTGERS L. REv. 293, 303-04 
(1979). 
4. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, INC., THE CHANGING BOARD 1980 UPDATE 2 (1980) [herein-
after cited as HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES 1980). This study seems to exclude from the definition 
of independent directors not only full-time corporate officers, but also their family members, 
retired corporate officers, lawyers and commercial or investment bankers doing business_with 
1 
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role of the new board in corporate govemance.5 
Although some evidence suggests that recent innovations 
designed to strengthen the board's role6 have been more cosmetic 
the corporation. Other studies citing higher percentages of outside directors do not seem to 
make this distinction. 
The most recent survey, conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission, finds that 
the boards of the largest companies (over $150 million in assets) consist of very slightly under a 
majority (48.5%) of"independent" directors, under the most stringent of definitions. Securities 
Exchange Act Release No. 17518, 21 SEC DOCKET 1551, 1558, at Table 2 (Feb. 17, 1981) 
[hereinafter cited as SEC 1980 Study]. This stricter definition of independent directors ex-
cludes: present employees of the company and its affiliates, former employees, relatives of 
executive officers, creditors, suppliers, customers, retained attorneys, investment bankers, and 
control persons. 
5. This trend is being accelerated at the instance of traditionally powerful forces on the 
corporate scene: the New York Stock Exchange, the Business Roundtable, and the American 
Bar Association. See Andrews, The Roundtable Statement on Boards of .Directors, HARV. Bus. 
REV., Sept.-Oct. 1978, at 24, 30; Corporate .Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW, 1591, 1625 
(1978) (ABA encourages nonmanagement director majorities to effectuate independent deci-
sion-making) [hereinafter cited as Guidebook]. But see Hetherington, When the Sleeper Wakes: 
Reflections on Corporate Governance and Shareholder Rights, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 183 (1979); 
Kripke, The SEC, Corporate Governance, and the Real Issues, 36 Bus. LAW. 173 (1981); Letts, 
Corporate Governance: A .Dtfferent Slant, 35 Bus. LAW. 1505 (1980). In 1978, the New York 
Stock Exchange required all its listed companies to create an audit committee composed of 
independent directors. 
6. Most of the largest corporations have audit committees of the board, with the power to 
delve deeply into the company's records, methods, and practices. See note 15 infra. The 
board's role is also expanding as a result of the creation of compensation committees, com-
pose<_l of independent directors. Such committees, which exist in most of the largest corpora-
tions, fix the terms of top management compensation. KORN/FERRY INTERNATIONAL, BOARD 
OF DIRECTORS SEVENTH ANNUAL STUDY 3 (1980) [hereinafter cited as KORN/FERRY 1980]. 
About 80% of the largest corporations have a compensation committee. SEC 1980 study,supra 
note 4, at Table 11. Over 88% of companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange have one. 
Id About 72% of the members of this committee in the largest companies are "independent" 
un_der the most stringent definition. Id at Table 16. In addition, over 45% of the 1,300 largest 
corporations have a director nominating committee. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES 1980, supra 
note 4, at 3. About 45.5% of responding companies from the 1000 largest industrial companies 
and 300 leading nonindustrial corporations have a nominating committee making the initial 
decision approving board prospects. This is a recent and significant change, Now, the initial 
decision in approving board prospects is made by the directors, not the chief executive, in 58% 
of the 1300 largest companies, either through the nominating committee (45.5%) or by all 
directors as a group (12.7%). Id Over 75% of the very largest corporations (at least $2 billion 
in sales) make the initial decision in the nominating committee (69.2%) or the decision is made 
by all directors (6.4%). Id The initial decision is made by the chief executive in 26.6% of all 
1300 companies and in 16.7% of the very largest companies. Id 
A more recent survey indicates that about 40% of the largest companies (over $150 million 
in assets) have a nominating committee. SEC 1980 Study, supra note 4, at Table 18. Almost 
49% of the largest companies which are listed on the New York Stock Exchange have one. Id. 
About two-thirds of the members of this committee in the largest companies are "independ-
ent" under the most stringent definition. Id Almost all (97.4%) nominating committees "se-
lect or recommend nominees" for the board, but only 12.7% "evaluate incumbent directors." 
Id at Table 21. See KORN/FERRY INTERNATIONAL, BOARD OF DIRECTORS EIGHTH ANNUAL 
STUDY 4 (1981) [hereinafter cited as KORN/FERRY 1981] (52% of the responding 576 large 
corporations have a nominating committee and another 8% are considering establishing one). 
Most of the largest corporations have board audit committees empowered to delve deeply 
into the company's records, methods and practices. Boulton, The Evolving Board· A Look at 
the Board's Changing Roles and Information Needs, 3 ACAD. MOT. REV. 827, 828 (1978) (dis-
cussing effects of increasingly active audit committees). Over 95% of the largest companies 
(over $150 million in assets) have an audit committee, including virtually all companies listed 
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than real,7 it is clear that the new board will become an important 
locus of corporate power in the near future. Substantive effects usu-
ally lag behind structural changes, and these changes are all rela-
tively recent. In fact, 1980 may have been the watershed year. 
Nearly half (48.5%) of the directors of companies with over $150 
million in assets were persons "independent" of management in a 
rigorous sense. These "independent" directors were not present or 
former officers, employees, relatives of officers, creditors, suppliers, 
customers, retained attorneys, investment bankers, or control stock-
holders of the company.8 In other words, the new breed of director 
has no economic stake in the company, other than the relatively 
modest compensation associated with the directorship. And since 
1980, the board, and not the chief executive, has made the initial 
decision approving nominees for election as directors in almost sev-
enty percent of the very largest corporations ($2 billion sales) and in 
over fifty-eight percent of the 1,300 largest companies.9 Nearly 
eighty percent of the 1,300 largest companies recently stated that the 
board will exert more influence, 10 and the momentum generated by 
recent pressures to reform corporate governance will undoubtedly 
continue. 
The board that is emerging in the large corporations to fill this 
more influential role is a peer group - a collegial body of equals in 
the critical sense that one (the chief executive) does not wield special 
power over the others. The independent directors will naturally give 
weight to the chief executive's views, based on the latter's special" 
knowledge and experience, but this is qualitatively different than the 
domination of the old board by the chief executive. This new equal-
ity among board members will be reinforced by the rough equality 
in socioeconomic status that has always existed on boards of direc-
on the New York Stock Exchange. SEC 1980 Study, supra note 4, at Table 11. About 82% of 
the members of this committee in the largest companies are "independent" under the most 
stringent definition. Id at Table 17. Of these committees, about 75.4% review the adequacy of 
the corporation's internal controls, but only 9% direct internal corporate investigations. Id at 
Table 20. See Burns, On the Rationale of the Corporate System, in THE CORPORATE SOCIETY 
121, 174 (R. Marris ed. 1974). . 
1. See Solomon, Restructuring the Corporate Board of Directors: Fond Hope - Faint 
Promise?, 16 MICH. L. REV. 581, 590-601 (1978). 
8. SEC 1980 Study, supra note 4, at Table 2. 
9. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES 1980, supra note 4, at 3. 
10. In a recent survey, nearly 80% of the 1300 largest companies believe boards will exert 
more influence on corporate governance in the future. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES 1980, supra 
note 4, at 1. Certain business commentators envision boards of directors playing a much more 
significant role in strategic planning for the company. See, e.g., Wommack, The Board's Most 
Important Function, HARV. Bus. REv., Sept-Oct. 1979, at 48. 
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tors.11 To discharge its new responsibilities, the new board will be 
more active, primarily through committees of the board, than the old 
board. Already the board and its committees are meeting more 
often. Directors are working harder, both in terms of preparatory 
homework and time spent at meetings, 12 and are receiving greater 
compensation.13 This trend toward more work and higher compen-
sation will likely continue, and boards may shrink in size to become 
optimal work groups (with the shirkers or those with too many direc-
torships resigning), or boards may divide progressively more work 
among their various committees.14 
It is unclear, however, whether the board's functions will increase 
beyond "monitoring" the performance of management, proffering 
advice to the chief executive when requested, and considering man-
agement's business proposals. Commentators agree that today the 
board does no more than this. Although time and informational 
constraints will continue to prevent the board from managing or ac-
tually supervising the corporation's business, its new-found indepen-
dence should result in more careful and skeptical consideration of 
management's business proposals than in the past. And the in-
dependent directors will demand, and receive, more information rel-
evant to important corporate matters. 15 
These emerging trends are consistent with the view, currently 
supported by the commentators and the corporate establishment, 
that directors should be "monitors."16 They are also consistent with 
viewing directors as "deciders." This Article's thesis is that, by rea-
11. KORN/FERRY 1981, supra note 6, at 3, Table 3. The independent directors are drawn , 
from the upper ranks of other companies, academia, the bar, commercial and investment 
banking, and the government. 
12. The boards of the largest companies (over $150 million in assets) meet 8.6 times per 
year. SEC 1980 Study, supra note 4, at Tables 2 & 8. About one-third have 9 to 12 board 
meetings per year. Id at 1553. In addition, the audit, compensation, and nominating commit-
tees of these companies meet, respectively, 3.2, 3.3, and 2.2 times per year. Id at Table 12. 
Further, the SEC observes that "there is evidence that some boards are becoming more ac-
tive." Id See KORN/FERRY 1981, supra note 6, at 8. See generally ARTHUR YOUNG EXECU· 
TIVE REsOURCE CONSULTANTS, THE NEW DIRECTOR 28-29 (1981) [hereinafter cited as THE 
NEW DIRECTOR] (board meetings may be decreasing from an average of 10 to 14 meetings per 
year in 1967 to six to eight meetings in 1979, but the use of committees is increasing 
significantly). 
13. KORN/FERRY 1981, supra note 6, at 5-8 (aggregate and average fees have increased, 
but fee per hour of work has decreased); SEC 1980 Study, supra note 4, at 1533. 
14. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, INC., THE CHANGING BOARD 4 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 
HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES 1977]. But see KORN/FERRY 1981, supra note 6, at 3 ("For the sev-
enth consecutive year, the average number of directors • • • is 13."). 
15. Boulton, supra note 6, at 835; HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES 1977, supra note 14, at 10. 
16. SEC, STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY,printedfor tire use ef SENATE 
COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 549-53 (1980) 
[hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT]. 
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son of its recently secured independence from management domina-
tion, the boards of directors of large American corporations are now 
in a unique position to make business decisions of the highest quali-
ty, 17 and that corporate law should respond to this potential appro-
priately. On the basis of findings in the behavioral sciences, this 
Article urges a limited rethinking of the role of the chief executive 
and the board of directors before the model of directors as 
"monitors" of the chief executive's performance is frozen in place. 
Already armed with information supposedly received as monitors, 
the independent director group can best employ its limited time by 
doing what corporate law used to command (and still strongly sug-
gests): making business decisions. 
There is growing recognition by the corporate establishment ,in 
America that its priorities should be reordered to achieve profit max-
imization in the long-term rather than in the short-term. The recent 
stress on financial wizardry and short-term profit may well shift to 
an emphasis on manufacturing superior products at prices competi-
tive with other nations and on making long-term investments for real 
productivity gains.18 The new board js uniquely equipped to make 
17. "High-quality decisions" is not a loaded phrase for some hidden social or political 
agenda. This Article simply assumes that an objective standard of excellence exists for busi-
ness decisions and focuses upon the traditionally important decisions of corporate life: mar-
kets, acquisitions, major corporate goals, and strategic planning, all for profit maximization. 
One could apply the approach just as consistently to social responsibility or any other goal, 
provided the peer decision-making group agrees upon the relevant common values and 
objectives. 
18. Reginald H. Jones, the recently retired charman of General Electric and Chairman of 
the Business Council, took this position in a recent interview in the Washington Post: 
The biggest problem in American business today, Jones said, is the sharp decline in 
the :1uality ofU.S.-produced goods, a factor he attributes largely to a "management-mal-
aise' that he says has permeated corporate suites in recent years and inhibited executives 
from taking steps to stay ahead. 
The only hope for correcting it: Revamp the thinking in corporate boardrooms, Jones 
says, so directors and stockholders recognize they sometimes must forgo short-term profits 
to make the kinds of needed investments that will "enhance the long-range opportunities 
of the corporation." 
"What we have today," Jones says, "is a bunch of money managers who are under 
tremendous pressure from Wall Street to have every quarter a little bit better than the last, 
and I'm not sure it's realistic." If you're going to make long-term improvements, he as-
serts, profits occasionally may have to slip. 
Jones complains bitterly that this profits-at-any-price quest has brought on a spate of 
illnesses in American business - not only the decline in quality, but a falloff in productiv-
ity, a slump in.corporate investment and a lag in research and development. 
How do you tum that around? "To me, that puts the onus squarely on the board of 
directors," Jones says. Corporate directors must "encourage management to make invest-
ments that will enhance" longer-range opportunities - even if they mean some diminu-
tion of profitability in the short run. 
In Corporate Leadership, An Era Ends at G.E. Co., Wash. Post, Mar. 29, 1981, § H, at 1, col 1, 
7, col. 3. See also Hayes & Abernathy, Managing our way to economic decline, HARV. Bus. 
REV., July-Aug. 1980, at 67. 
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these decisions. Neither time nor informational constraints should 
foreclose such decisions from board purview. The difference be-
tween directors as monitors or deciders is one of degree or emphasis. 
But like gender, the difference could become dramatic. 
In Part I, this Article summarizes the empirical research that 
compares the decision-making capabilities of peer groups such as the 
new board with those of individuals and other groups. All other 
things being equal, the new board will make better decisions than 
the individuals and groups within the corporation who have a more 
direct stake in its short-term profitability. Part II suggests some legal 
responses to these findings. It argues primarily that the law should 
encourage truly independent directors to serve and act not merely as 
"monitors," but rather as "deciders." To promote these ends, courts 
can accord more certain, and probably greater, legal protection to 
business decisions reached by the truly independent board than does 
current law. This can be effected by the courts under the business 
judgment rule. Part II concludes with a brief discussion of certain 
legal rules and corporate governance "reform" proposals that may 
create inequalities of power among the directors, and thus under-
mine quality decision-making. 
A number of other factors, discussed in Part Ill, may also affect 
the quality of peer group decision-making. For example, the behav-
ioral sciences, particularly the small group literature, suggest that 
"cohesiveness," friendship, and trust among group members - as 
well as common values and objectives - promote better group per-
formance. The first section of Part III thus considers various govern-
ance proposals that threaten group cohesiveness. It then examines 
the extent to which corporate law should distinguish among directors 
for liability purposes, and urges that courts refrain from ipdividual-
izing the scope of directorial duty unless a particular director's con-
duct is fraudulent or illegal. 
The second section of Part Ill analyzes other conditions that pro-
mote high quality decisions. Small group researchers suggest that 
the proper group size for optimal decision-making is five, supporting 
the typical thirteen-person board that divides decision-making tasks 
among smaller committees. Other behavioral scientists have found 
that a "consensus" decision rule results in better group decisions 
than does a majority rule. Corporate law should respond 
appropriately. 
Part Ill's final section confirms that peer group decision-making 
is not a panacea. Unless counteracted, the natural group pressures 
promoting conformity and a rush to decide will undermine quality 
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decisions. The empirical findings suggest certain procedural steps 
that the new board can take to ameliorate "groupthink" tendencies. 
Certain of these procedures-e.g., separating the roles of chief exec-
utive and chairperson of the board or assigning a different director at 
each meeting to serve as a formal devil's advocate - have received 
substantial evidential support. The courts can provide incentives to 
adopt one or more of these procedures by affording additional legal 
protections to the decisions of an independent board that has such a 
procedure in place. 
Part IV takes up the thorniest subject - the proper allocation of 
decision-making between the chief executive and the n,ew board in 
the large corporation. Social psychologists have found that peer 
groups make better decisions than do individuals, whose limited cog-
nitive capacities lead to more systematic errors in decision-making 
than was previously supposed. These findings suggest that the board 
should make more of the decisions currently made by the individual 
chief executive. Time constraints demand that most major decisions 
be made by the chief executive, either alone or in consultation with 
subordinates. But, the Article argues, the board, and not the chief 
executive, should formulate long-term and strategic plans, 19 make 
decisions affecting the entire organization, and choose between stark 
alternatives. Peer group decision-making by the new board will be 
better in such cases than decisions by the chief executive. 
Recognizing that these changes may not occur without some ju-
dicial prodding, Part IV suggests several legal approaches to the di-
vision of decision-making between the chief executive and the new 
board. By extending the protection of the business judgment rule, 
courts can encourage the board to decide more and delegate less to 
the chief executive. Similarly, by denying business judgment protec-
tion and revitalizing agency principles, they can discourage the chief 
executive from making business decisions that should be left to the 
board. 
At the same time, corporate law should eliminate any suggestion 
that independent directors must conduct their own investigations 
into corporate activities. "Monitoring," in the investigative sense, 
should be the duty of the chief executive and responsible senior exec-
utives, not the new board. The courts should utilize agency princi-
19. See Shanklin & Ryans, Inside/Outside Director Ieformation Needs: A Survey, DIREC-
TORS & BOARDS, Winter 1981, at 22-25; Wommack, supra note 10, at 48 (board's "most impor-
tant function is to approve or send back . . . management's recommendations about the future 
direction of the corporation"). Cf. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES 1977, supra note 14, at 11 (noting 
that two-thirds of the board chairmen surveyed considered input on long-term planning to be 
the board's most important function). 
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ples or the business judgment rule to encourage the chief executive 
to pierce the pervasive informational blockages in the huge organiza-
tion, and report to the board the information that is critical to its 
decisions. In the process, the chief executive will also acquire more 
accurate information in the decision areas that the board has explic-
itly delegated to him. 
1. THE FINDINGS OF THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 
A. Can the Behavioral Sciences Supply "Empirical" Findings? 
Many persons perceive the behavioral sciences, particularly psy-
chology and social psychology, as "soft" - too general and vague to 
be put to practical use, and too new to be given weight in daily af-
fairs.20 They are naturally skeptical of "empirical" findings that are 
based on laboratory experiments conducted by a professor, with his 
or her students as subjects. Two methodological problems may jus-
tify this natural skepticism. First, it is not clear that college students 
are representative of the population at large.21 Second, these find-
ings may be distorted by the "experimenter expectancy effect," 
which occurs when the professor unconsciously gets his students to 
do what he wants them to do and then reports their actions as empir-
ical findings. 22 
Behavioral scientists, however, are increasingly using the meth-
odologies of the natural sciences to measure the variables in human 
behavior. Many of the findings summarized in this Article were first 
made in controlled laboratory studies and later confirmed by field 
observations in natural settings.23 Recent experimental designs have 
also sought to eliminate the experimenter expectancy effect. And, as 
some recent findings in cognitive psychology suggest, it is our much-
prized individual intuition that may be "soft" and unreliable.24 
20. See Miller, Hard Realities and.Soft Social Science, PUB. INTEREST., Spring 1980, at 67. 
21. Miner,A Comparative Analysis of Three Diverse Group Decision Making Approaches, 22 
ACAD. MGT. J. 81, 90 (1979) (quoting McNemar, Opinion Altitude Methodology, 43 PSYCH. 
BULL. 289, 333 (1946)) (''the existing science of human behavior is largely the science of the 
behavior of [college) sophomores"). 
A classic and incisive analysis of directors' behavior under various legal rules was provided 
by Professor Alfred F. Conard, and, happily, without reliance on findings concerning college 
sophomores. See Conard, A Behavioral Analysis of Directors' Liability far Negligence, 1972 
DUKE LJ. 895. 
22. R. ROSENTHAL, EXPERIMENTER EFFECTS IN BEHAVIORAL REsEARCH 127-40 (1966). 
See Krattenmaker & Powe, Televised Violence: First Amendment Principles and Social Science 
Theory, 64 VA. L. REv. 1123, 1153-54 (1978). 
23. Cf. M. SHAW, GROUP DYNAMICS 428-36 (3d ed. 1981) (noting that field observations 
have confirmed a number of laboratory findings concerning group behavior). 
24. See notes 208-22 infra and accompanying text 
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A vast body of literature exists on group decision-making. Well-
known psychologists, political scientists, social psychologists, econo-
mists, sociologists, and others have contributed to the field. The em-
pirical evidence strongly supports the proposition that, all other 
things being equal, decisions_ made by a peer group are qualitatively 
better than those of an individual or of a group of nonpeers. 
B. Peer Groups Make Better Decisions Than Do Individuals 
The evidence shows that peer groups produce better solutions to 
problems than d9 individuals working alone. With some dissent, the 
evidence also supports the proposition that peer groups perform bet-
ter than the best individual in the group. This is the "assembly bo-
nus effect." Intellectual synergy apparently occurs in peer groups. 
The types of problems used in the many experiments vary 
greatly.25 The studies are, however, sufficiently similar to indicate 
that group superiority obtains when the contributions of several indi-
viduals can be combined, when decisions require the creation of 
ideas and recall of information, and when group members are per-
mitted to correct individual errors.26 Theories advanced to explain · 
group superiority include the influence and ability of the best or 
most confident group member and the greater individual interest in 
the problem that participation in group decision-making arouses.27 
Groups also correct errors of fact or of judgment that are randomly 
distributed among their members.28 Obviously, groups expend more 
person-hours than individuals,29 but the potential benefits from 
high-quality decisions at the top level of the largest corporations 
overwhelmingly outweigh the extent to which costs of director-group 
decisions exceed the costs of decisions by individual chief 
executives.30 
The earliest studies involved simple tasks with one correct solu-
tion, and groups clearly outperformed individuals.31 Later, in 1959, 
25. See M. SHAW, supra note 23, at 60-64. 
26. Id at 78. 
27. Id at 64. 
28. See id at 57-62, 77-78. 
29. Id at 78. 
30. The "costs" referred to are the dollar costs of the corporation and the opportunity costs 
of the directors. If opportunity costs become too high because too much work is demanded 
from them, the directors will simply quit. Thus, the corporation faces an upper limit on the 
amount of decision-making it can demand from the new board. 
31. For example, Thorndike in 1938 found that, in experiments involving 56 Barnard stu-
dents, groups were superior to individuals in problems involving sentence completion, lime-
ricks, and crossword puzzles. Thorndike concluded that groups are superior when dealing 
with materials ''permitting a greater range of response." Thorndike, On Wltat Type of Task 
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Barnlund reported evidence of group superiority in logical problem 
solving.32 He compared the performances of individuals working 
alone and as members of decision groups, recording and analyzing 
the discussions of over 170 college students making 829 decisions. 
Only two of the twenty-nine groups failed to outperform their own 
best member. In both of these groups, an individual had received an 
almost perfect initial score. Barnlund concluded that the superior 
group results reflected the dynamics of the group itself, which led to 
greater concentration on the problem, more enthusiasm, stimulation 
of more careful thinking, consideration of a wider range of ideas, 
and critical testing of ideas through discussion. 33 
More recent experimental designs evince a high degree of scien-
tific sophistication and use advanced statistical techniques to evalu-
ate both the design and the results. For example, Felsenthal and 
Fuchs presented individuals and groups with a complex problem in-
volving over twenty variables and having only one correct answer. 
The results corroborate the proposition that groups are superior to 
individuals in complex problem solving.34 Other recent experiments 
reported by Hall and Watson35 and by NemirofP6 evaluated com-
plex decisions made under conditions of high uncertainty - the con-
text of most major business decisions. Both used the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration's Moon Survival Problem. 
Subjects ranked fifteen items of equipment in order of their impor-
tance for survival, making fifteen interdependent judgments. All 
subjects first ranked the fifteen items on their own, and then joined 
groups. The experimenters instructed certain groups to tolerate di-
Will a Group do Well?, 33 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCH. 409,413 (1938). Similarly, Taylor and 
Faust in 1952 found that groups performed significantly better than individuals in playing the 
game of Twenty Questions. Taylor & Faust, Twenty Questions: Efficiency in Problem Solving 
as a Function of Size of Group, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 360, 367 (1952). They found 
superiority in terms of fewer questions posed, fewer number of failures, and shorter elapsed 
time to solution. In the experiment, 105 psychology students participated. Thirty small groups 
were compared to fifteen individuals over a period of five days of testing. Id. at 361. The 
game is an example of a problem involving broad and imaginative search leading to one spe-
cific solution. 
32. Barnlund, A Comparative Study of Individual, Majority, and Group Judgment, 58 J, 
ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCH. 55, 56 (1959). 
33. Id. at 59-60. 
34. Felsenthal & Fuchs, Experimental Evaluation of Five Designs of Redundant Organiza-
tional Systems, 21 Ao. Sci. Q. 474,485 (1976) (reporting on experiments involving 1,674 third-
year college students). 
35. Hall & Watson, The Effects of a Normative Intervention on Group Decision-Making Per-
formance, 23 HUMAN REL. 299 (1970) (reporting on experiments involving 148 businessper-
sons attending various management seminars). 
36. P. Nemiroff, Group Decision-Making Performance as Influenced by Consensus and 
Self-Orientation (Oct. 1973) (unpublished graduate paper on file with the Michigan Law 
Review). 
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verse opinions and attempt to reach a consensus. Other groups were 
given no instructions. Hall and Watson's sixteen instructed groups 
outperformed their most proficient member, while the sixteen unin-
structed groups performed as well as their most proficient member 
and better than the average individual in the group.37 Nemiroffrep-
licated Hall and Watson's experiment, and obtained nearly the same 
results.38 
Empirical studies have consistently indicated that peer groups 
outperform individuals in complex problem solving. Only one ma-
jor summary registered a partial dissent. Olmstead and Hare agree 
that groups generate more correct solutions, make fewer errors, de-
tect errors more quickly than individuals and are "usually better at 
solving problems than the average individual" in the group. They 
concluded, however, that groups are "seldom better than the best 
individual."39 
In all important aspects, the peer group superiority findings ap-
ply to the new board. Independent directors now comprise the ma-
jority of a collegial body of equals at the apex of the corporate 
hierarchy. These independent directors, unlike the chief executive 
and the various vice presidents and middle-level managers, have no 
direct stake in the year-to-year fluctuations in the corporation's prof-
its. Their annual directors' compensation is not geared to short-term 
results. In the very largest corporations, directors typically receive 
flat annual compensation plus a fixed per-meeting fee, resulting in 
noncontingent compensation ranging from $18,000 to $22,000 per 
annum.4° Compensation at this level does not give the typical in-
dependent director a significant economic stake in the company be-
cause these highly qualified persons could earn more for the 
directorial time and effort expended (and with lesser potential liabil-
ity) in their principal or related occupations.41 The potential for 
37. Hall & Watson, supra note 35, at 300-01. 
38. P. Nemiroff, supra note 36, at 8, 22. 
39. M. OLMSTED & A. HARE, THE SMALL GROUP 86 (2d ed. 1978). They further state: 
[R]esearch has revealed no unambiguous rules for constructing creative groups .... Ex-
ecutives responsible for establishing the methods of decision-making and problem-solving 
for their organizations may be able to acquire insights and wisdom from small-group 
research, but as yet there is a dearth of applicable and at the same time adequately 
grounded and reliable findings. 
Id at 86. 
40. KORN/FERRY 1981, supra note 6, at 14. The SEC 1980 Study, supra note 4, at Tables 
8, 9, 10 & 12, indicates a lower range of compensation, but the KORN/FERRY data is not on a 
basis comparable to the SEC data. 
41. The "hourly rate" averages $119. KORN/FERRY 1981, supra note 6, at 8. 
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high-quality decision-making in the large corporation thus exists in 
the new board. 
C. Other Decision-Making Groups: Uneven Decision Quality 
The new board is in a unique position to make decisions guided 
solely by the qualitative standard of excellence in furthering corpo-
rate goals. In contrast to the new board, the chief executive, other 
high officers, and middle-level managers of the largest corporations 
earn extremely large salaries, and many receive contingent compen-
sation of hundreds of thousands of dollars (and more for some chief 
executives) based upon the bottom-line profit in the particular year. 
Given such high individual stakes, the vice-presidents group, the 
managers of the various autonomous divisions of the large corpora-
tion, and some other decision-making peer groups below them tend 
to make decisions based more upon individual security and advance-
ment than upon qualitative excellence.42 Short-term solutions, coali-
tion bargaining among divisional managers, "political" 
acceptability, "muddling through," "satisficing," and "log rolling" 
are endemic ·to decision-making by these peer groups because of 
their large and direct stakes in the short-term operations of the or-
ganization.43 Whether their particular decisions also meet objective 
criteria of excellence depends primarily on chance. The previously 
summarized findings of peer group superiority do not apply to these 
groups. 
Until recently, the chief executive, the various vice presidents, re-
tained counsel, and others beholden to the chief executive comprised 
42. See generally P. DRUCKER, THE PRACTICE OF MANAGEMENT 147-75 (1954); Hayes, 
The Real Story on Group Executives, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Fall 1980, at 11, 11-16; Vance, 
Shared Chief Executive Authority: Chaos or Collegiality?, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Fall 1980, at 
5 ( chief executive authority sharing by a small group in major companies is on the rise again). 
But see Greyhound Taps Batastini as President, Revives Executive Office After 5 1 /2 Years, Wall 
St. J., Nov. 21, 1980, at 8, col. 2 (reporting on the formation of a chief executive "group," but 
not peers). 
43. See, e.g., R. CYERT & J. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM (1963); D. 
KATZ & R. KAHN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS (2d ed. 1978); J. MARCH & 
H. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 47-52 (1958); J. STEINBRUNER, THE CYBERNETIC THEORY OF DE• 
CISION 62, 74-75 (1974); Carter, The Behavioral Theory of the Firm and Top-Level Corporate 
.Decisions, 16 AD. Sci. Q. 413,421 (1971); Gamson,A Theory of Coalition Formation, in SMALL 
GROUPS 562 (A. Hare, E. Borgatta & R. Bales eds. rev. ed. 1965); Johnson, Conflict Avoidance 
Through Acceptable .Decisions, 21 HUMAN REL. 71, 81 (1974) (top management makes the 
"second best decision" in order to increase certainty and reduce interpersonal friction); May-
hew & Levinger, On the Emergence of Oligarchy in Human Interaction, 81 AM. J. Soc. 1017, 
1040-41 (1976); Pfeffer, Power and Resource Allocation in Organizations, in PsYCHOLOOICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 278, 281-82 (B. Staw ed. 1977); Suedfeld, 
Characteristics of .Decision Making as a Function of the Environment, in MANAGERIAL CON· 
. TROL AND ORGANIZATIONAL DEMOCRACY 203, 209 (1978); Zaleznik, Power and Politics In 
Organizational L!fe, HARv. Bus. REV., May-June 1970, at 47. 
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a majority of the directors of most of the largest companies. The 
chief executive dominated the board, whose decision-making quali-
tatively resembled individual decision-making by the chief execu-
tive. Similarly, "group" decision-making sessions in large 
corporations today often do not involve peer groups because the par-
ticipants rarely occupy the same positions in the hierarchy. As Rich-
ard Hoffman has stated: 
The social systems in which the group is embedded impinge on its 
functioning. The authority relationships deriving from the formal or-
ganization structure seem most powerful. People with higher organiza-
tional ranks tend to participate more actively and to exercise undue 
influence in the group. These tendencies arC?, unfortunately, unrelated 
to the likelihood of their having the appropriate resources to solve the 
problem under consideration. The traditional stereotype that leaders 
control the decision process is held even by college students, with 
harmful effects on the problem-solving effectiveness of groups in our 
laboratory studies. The typical organizational reward system promotes 
this dependence on the leader's influence.44 
Argyris and Schon make the same point in a different way when they 
observe that "[top management] sessions are rarely classifiable as 
problem-solving sessions."45 
The limited evidence available also indicates that subordinates 
distort information when reporting to their superiors. Unless the 
subordinates trust their superior, they may say what they think the 
superior wants to hear.46 The superior-subordinate relationship may 
similarly prejudice group ''voting" on decisions. The pressure upon 
the subordinates in a group to conform to what they anticipate their 
superiors want is very strong.47 Its pervasive presence in the corpo-
rate sector cannot be doubted, given the rewards that conformity of-
44. Hoffman,Appifing Experimental Research on Group Problem Solving to Organizations, 
15 J. APPLIED BEHAVIORAL Sci. 375, 380 (1979) (citations omitted). 
45. Id. at 375 (citations omitted). 
46. See 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETs AND HIERARCHIES 122-23 (1975); A. ZANDER, 
GROUPS AT WORK 28 (1977); Hoffman, supra note 44, at 387; Newman & Sussman, Controlling 
the Sycophant: Policies and Techniques of Corporation Presidents, ADV. MoT. J., Aug. 1978, at 
14-15. q: Driscoll, Trust and Participation in Organizational .Decisio{I Making as Predictors of 
Satisfaction, 21 AcAD. MOT. J. 44, 44 (1978) (trust is defined as ''the belief that decision mak-
ers will produce outcomes favorable to the person's interests without any influence by the 
person"). An experienced chief executive or other superior will "discount" or "counter-bias" 
information from subordinates. A good chief executive usually knows when the marketing 
executives are exaggerating projected sales or when they are doing the opposite (so as to claim 
credit at year-end for "increased" sales). However; a counter-biasing chief executive probably 
will not learn the true state of facts. He may not, for example, learn the sales figure that the 
marketing executives or even the sales people on the spot really believe will be achieved. See 
Jablin & Sussman, Sycophancy in the Boardroom: Causes and Controls, DIRECTORS & 
BOARDS, Winter 1980, at 40, 45. In contrast, communication in a peer group is very efficient. 
0. WILLIAMSON, supra, at 46-47. 
41. See note 46 supra. 
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fers and the authoritarian-hierarchical traditions in most large 
corporations.48 The quality of decisions made by such nonpeer 
groups is probably quite uneven, determined primarily by the quali-
ty of the individual superior's decision. 
II. THE ROLE OF CORPORATE LAW IN PROMOTING PEER GROUP 
DECISION-MAKING 
The behavioral- sciences point to the new board as the best hope 
for high-quality major decisions in the large corporation. The courts 
can and should encourage the trend toward independent and more 
active, boards. by providing nearly absolute protection under the 
business judgment rule for the decisions made by a board or com-
mittee composed of a majority of independent directors. All busi-
ness decisions by the independent directors should be insulated from 
attack in shareholder's derivative suits, save for (1) utterly gross mis-
takes of judgment that were patently obvious at the time of decision 
and resulted in very substantial and tangible damage to the corpora-
tion, and (2) those limited categories of decisions that directly and 
personally affect the fate of their codirectors, such as the decision to 
terminate a shareholder suit against codirectors.49 Articulation of 
the rule in these terms ( except for the second proviso) would afford 
greater and more certain legal protection to the decisions of in-
dependent directors than present case law. And, there appears to be 
a process-of-decision proviso to the business judgment rule, requir-
ing due care or ordinary diligence by the directors. As argued later, 
this proviso should be eliminated or strongly diluted.50 
A rule that clearly articulated almost absolute protection for 
business decisions made by the new board might well increase, well 
beyond a bare majority, the number of independent directors on the 
new board. It may also encourage the chief executive to pass to the 
board certain important decisions that the chief executive previously 
made alone or in nonpeer group settings. Since the findings of the 
behavioral sciences indicate that, all other things being equal, peer 
48. See M. SHAW, supra note 23, at 399; A. ZALEZNIK & M. KETS DE VRIES, POWER AND 
THE CORPORATE MIND 254 (1975); Argyris, The CEO's Behavior: Key lo Organizational Devel-
opment, HARV. Bus. R.Ev., Mar.-Apr. 1973, at 55, 56. 
49. The co-director exception raises wholly different behavioral issues because the cohesive 
peer group is asked to judge the conduct of one of its members. The derivative suit dismissal 
rule is the subject of many recent articles, most of which question the objectivity of judgments 
by directors of their codirectors. See Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival oJ the Derivative Suit: 
An Evaluation and a Proposal far Legislative Reform, 81 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 261 (1981), and the 
articles cited therein at 263 n. 13. 
50. See text at notes 171-200 infra. 
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groups outperform. both individuals, who may have severely limited 
cognitive capacities,51 and nonpeer groups, whose decisions are une-
ven in quality, these by-products will be beneficial. 
A. The Business Judgment Rule 
The business judgment rule supposedly protects directors from 
liability for their mistaken business decisions, absent fraud or self-
dealing. A commentator has summarized the rule as follows: 
' I 
Whether or not there is a specific statutory standard courts have 
widely applied the business-judgment rule to shield directors against 
allegations of ordinary negligence absent specific wrongful action by 
them. A court, it is said, will not substitute its judgment'·for 'that of 
directors when they act reasonably and in good faith. In the absence of 
self-dealing, therefore, if a decision of a board of directors can be at-
tributed to "any rational business purpose," a court will not hold a 
director liable for honest errors or mistakes of judgment. 52 
A number of policies underlie this rule, including encouraging quali-
fied persons to serve as directors, minimizing judicial interference to 
permit private business enterprises to function at maximum effi-
ciency, freeing directors to take business risks without inordinate 
caution, and avoiding the imposition of unfair liabilities by judges 
and juries who lack competence to evaluate complex business deci-
sions and gain their wisdom by hindsight. 53 A tenet of free enter-
prise - the market can efficiently punish corporations for the 
negative outcomes of honest but erroneous decisions - also supports 
this rule. 
Although judicial articulations of the rule appear clear and cer-
tain, commentators disagree about the scope of a process-of-decision 
proviso and the actual standard applied by courts to the business 
decision itself. 54 One group sees little court intervention, except for 
51. See notes 208-22 infra and accompanying text. 
52. Caplin, Outside Directors and Their Responsibilities: A Program far the Exercise of Due 
Care, l J. CORP. L. 57, 59-60 (1975) (footnotes omitted). 
53. See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 630-31, 393 N:E.2d 994, 1002, 419 
N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (1979). 
54. One commentator has noted that the statutory expression of a standard of conduct is 
less significant than its subsequent application by the judiciary. Lewis, The Business Judgment 
Rule and Corporate Directors' Liability for Mismanagement, 22 BAYLOR L. REv. 157, 162 
(1970). The courts disagree on what the standard of conduct is because "duty" is a potentially 
dynamic concept offering an opportunity for judicial sensitivity to practices as they develop. 
See Mundheim, A Time lo Learn, in COMMENTARIES ON CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND Gov-
ERNANCE 179, 181 (D. Schwartz ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as COMMENTARIES]. Certain com-
mentators argue that the duty of care whicl). the courts impose on a director under the business 
judgment rule is a much lower standard than that of an ordinary prudent person. See Cary, 
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 680-81 (1974); 
Kaplan, Fair Treatment of Shareholders, in COMMENTARIES, supra, at 215, 221°22. Critics 
further point out that this lower standard may be a product of courts too often limiting their 
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the most extreme cases. Professor Bishop has articulated this view: 
The search for cases in which directors of industrial corporations 
have been held liable in derivative suits for negligence uncomplicated 
by self-dealing is a search for a very small number of needles in a very 
large haystack. 
. . . All in all, I remain very skeptical of the proposition that direc-
tors of industrial corporations run any substantial risk of liability for 
ordinary negligence. 55 
Samuel Arsht, on the other hand, recently concluded that the poten-
tial for court intervention is high and that the rule does not bar lia-
bility for ordinary negligence. 56 The leading corporate texts and 
most decided cases also talk of directorial liability for ordinary negli-
gence.57 Cases actually holding directors liable for want of ordinary 
care are few'or nonexistent,58 but most derivative suits against direc-
tors are settled before judgment. The threatened ordinary care stan-
dard may be a principal reason for such settlements. 
One can reasonably conclude that a capable and independent di-
rector today makes business decisions only with some trepidation. 
Whether that director will confront the relatively safe insanity stan-
dard ("any rational business purpose"), or a gross negligence (reck-
lessness) standard, or an "ordinary negligence" standard for business 
decisions or the process leading up to them is uncertain. 
inquiry to the question of whether fraud or conflict of interest is present. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil 
Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 722 (Del. 1971). Other commentators assert that ordinary neg-
ligence is the standard, and, further, that a duty of inquiry is a prerequisite to the use of the 
business judgment rule. See, e.g., 3A w. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS § 1040 (1975 & Supp. 1980); Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Rev/siled, 8 
HOFSTRA L. Rev. 93, 100 (1979); Guidebook, supra note 5, at 1602. Cf. Cary & Harris, Stan-
dards of Conduct Under Common Law, Present .Day Statutes and the Model Act, 27 Bus. LAW. 
61, 70 (Spec. Issue Feb. 1972) ("I believe that the distinction between the business judgment 
rule and the negligence rule .•• which is already somewhat obscure, will largely vanish."). 
55. Bishop, Sitting .Ducks and .Decoy .Ducks: New Trends in Indemn!ftcation of Corporate 
.Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L. J. 1078, 1099-101 (1968). 
56. Arsht argues that the cases in which the business judgment defense was denied as a 
result of gross negligence are consistent with those cases using a "mere negligence" standard of 
care. Arsht, supra note 54, at 100-11; Arsht & Hinsey, Cod!fted Standard- Sofe Harbor Bui 
Charted Channel· A Response, 35 Bus. LAW ix, xiv (1980). 
57. FLETCHER, supra note 54, § 1029, at 12 ("[I]t is now the general rule that want of 
ordinary care creates liability.") (footnote omitted); H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS§ 234, at 453-55 (2d ed. 1970); N. LATTIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS§ 78, 
at 274 (2d ed. 1971); Cf. H. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS§ 63, at 158-59 (rev. 
ed. 1946) ("The degree of negligence depends upon what degree of care and diligence is due 
and owing, whether slight, ordinary or great."). 
58. Professor Bishop found only four cases of apparent negligence uncomplicated by self-
dealing, none of which, he concluded, carried "real conviction." Bishop, supra note 55, at 
1099-100. 
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B. Truly Independent Directors Should Be Given 
Incentives To Serve 
17 
The courts can use the ambiguities in the business judgment rule 
to promote decision-making by independent directors: the "any ra-
tional" basis test or a gross negligence "plus more" standard -
clearly articulated - would apply to business decisions reached by a 
board or committee with a majority of truly independ_ent, directors, 
while the standard applicable to the management-dominateg. board, 
and possibly to the nonindependent directors on the new board, 
could properly remain unsettled. 
The principle supporting such manipulation of an arg.bigµous le-
gal rule can be traced to the seminal case of Barnes v. Andrews, in 
which Judge Learned Hand stated: "No men of sense would take 
the office, if the law imposed upon them a guaranty of the general 
success of their companies as a penalty for any negligence."59 This 
incentive-to-serve rationale, articulated in 1924 in Barnes, had little 
meaning then for most directors of large companies. Their incentive 
to serve was the pure profit motive, either as highly paid managers of 
the company or as persons doing business with it. The incentive ra-
tionale was as hollow to them as it is for nonindependent directors, 
who serve for the same reasons today. Courts need not grant nearly 
absolute protection for decisional outcomes to these individuals. 
In contrast, truly independent persons would respond to greater 
and more certain protection under the business judgment rule by 
more readily accepting invitations to serve as directors. Although 
the "real" reasons that independent directors serve today are un-
clear, the pat answers - money, power, perquisites, and prestige -
are unsatisfactory. Generally, the individuals who have accepted 
(and will in the future accept) the role have already reached the so-
cioeconomic apex, with all the accoutrements. That their "margin" 
for acceptance is their desire for still more of these goods is unper-
suasive, 60 especially if one considers the increasing demands on in-
dependent directors to work harder, and their positive responses 
thereto.61 It seems unlikely, therefore, that independent directors 
59. 298 F. 614,617 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). "If the test of negligence which is applicable in the 
field of torts or in the Estate field were similarly applicable in the business or banking field, it 
would realistically be very difficult if not almost impossible to secure the services of able and 
experienced corporate directors." Smith v. Brown-Borhek Co., 414 Pa. 325,333,200 A.2d 398, 
401 (1964) (emphasis in original). 
60. See generally C. ALDERFER, EXISTENCE, RELATEDNESS AND GROWTH (1972); A. MAs-
LOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY (2d ed. 1970); D. McCLELLAND, THE ACHIEVEMENT 
MOTIVE (1976); D. McCLELLAND, THE ACHIEVING SOCIETY (1961). 
61. See text at notes l2-14supra. 
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view the job as a mere sinecure to be favorably added in the "mar-
gin" favoring acceptance. 
Some of the pat answers may figure into the mix, but "high-
achievement" independent directors may accept the role principally 
to satisfy their individual need for new and challenging exper-
iences62 in a pleasant interpersonal atmosphere. If this speculation 
or anything close to it is the true margin of decision today, then 
stringent liability rules for truly independent directors could tilt the 
margin against· choosing to serve. 63 
The incentive to serve rationale, then, affords a principled basis 
for distingu~shing between the civil liability standards applicable to 
truly independent directors and the other directors. Or, the courts 
could apply the same highly protective standard to all directors, but 
distinguish the respective burdens of proof. 64 Whether the courts 
should make any distinction depends upon other factors, some of 
which will be discussed later in connection with group cohesive-
ness. 65 To promote director independence, it may be best to leave 
the negative implication of strong protection for the independent di-
rectors an open question. Courts should understand, however, that 
testing the business decisions of nonindependent directors against an 
ordinary negligence standard may undermine other policies behind 
the business judgment rule. 
Recent decisions under the business judgment rule consistently 
support, and can be read as strong judicial encouragement of, the 
62. See note 60 supra; HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES 1977, supra note 14, at 8 (''two thirds of 
recently elected outside directors surveyed ... in another study report that the opportunity to 
contribute was the reason they joined boards"). Mace reported that chief executives joined the 
boards of other companies to learn, and compare the experiences with those in their own 
companies. M. MACE, supra note 3, at 109. Chief executives and retired chief executives are 
the two largest sources of outside directors. KORN/FERRY 1981, supra note 6, at 1. The retired 
senior executives are undoubtedly motivated by a strong desire to "relive" challenging exper-
iences and to compare them with those at their former company. For the former high govern-
ment officials, the members of academia and the bar, the board experience can easily be 
visualized as "new and challenging." 
63. Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 49, at 317 (footnote omitted), propose a statutory dam-
age "ceiling keyed to the financial circumstances of the individual defendant and applicable 
only to cases involving exclusively violations of the duty of due care," The ceiling is a maxi-
mum of "the highest Annual Gross Income of such person during the five calendar years 
preceding" the verdict, and in some cases, the total director's fees received. Id at 335. A 
ceiling would be quite helpful in preserving the thin margin of decision, but both the ceiling 
and the standard ("due care") proposed may be pegged too high for the target population. 
The chief executive of another company is the prime source of independent directors. That 
chief executive may change the margin of decision if the threat involves one year's past income 
(which may be a million dollars or more) and a stigmatizing finding that he or she is a negli-
gent businessperson. 
64. See note 70 i'!fra. 
65. See notes 101-05 i,ifra and accompanying text. 
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trend toward independent directors. In the corporate takeover area, 
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co. 66 and Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, 
Inc. 67 are significant. Both cases protected the decision of the board 
to resist a takeover by another corporation under the business judg-
ment rule. In Panter, the Seventh Circuit stated: 
We also note that a majority of the directors of Field's were "in-
dependent": they derived no income from Field's other than normal 
directors' fees and the equivalent of an employee discoun~ on mer-
chandise. The presumption of good faith the business judgment rule 
affords is heightened when the majority of the board consists of in-
dependent outside directors. 68 
In Crouse-Hinds, the Second Circuit held that a director's "interest" 
t 
in remaining a director, standing alone, is insufficient to tebut the 
presumption under the business judgment rule that directors have 
acted properly and in good faith. 69 The truly independent director 
will meet the Crouse-Hinds test because, by definition, he does not 
have significant pecuniary interests in the corporation. Other cases 
in the takeover area indicate that corporate officers and other per-
sons who have direct pecuniary interests in the corporation (such as 
its retained attorney) face higher burdens of proof or more stringent 
liability standards than other directors when the board's decision is 
challenged. 70 
An.other recent line of cases involves the power of independent 
directors to dismiss stockholder derivative suits brought.against their 
codirectors.71 Although the subject is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle, one can at least recognize the great, and often absolute, protec-
tion that independent directors can provide management directors 
under the business judgment rule. These cases thus create strong in-
centives for management to invite independents to join the board. 
C. Preserving Equality Among the Directors 
Members of the peer groups that the behavioral sciences rank 
best for decision-making must maintain their equality inter se. The 
66. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3443 (U.S. Dec. 1, 1981). 
67. 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980). 
68. 646 F.2d at 294. 
69. 634 F.2d at 702. 
70. See, e.g., Cheffv. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964) (directors who had no personal 
financial interest in preventing a minority shareholder from gaining control had a lighter bur-
den of proof in justifying a corporate purchase of the minority shareholder's stock than those 
directors who had a financial interest); Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (1962) 
(Chairman-President held liable; other directors not liable; but Chairman-President failed to 
advise board of facts in a timely fashion). 
11. See Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 49. 
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chief executive no longer dominates the independent board; all di-
rectors deal with each other from positions of equal power and influ-
ence - peers, in the truest sense. However, equality is fragile. 
Seemingly small tinkering may upset the fine balance. 
A stark example would be granting directors the power to re-
move a codirector from office with or without cause, but most boards 
have no such power.72 A more subtle threat to peerage was recently 
advocated in a Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") staff 
report that would increase the functions of the new board's nominat-
ing committee. Most of the largest corporations have a committee of 
the board, composed of a majority of independent directors, which 
recommends nominees for election as directors to fill vacancies cre-
ated by resignation, death, and other causes. The courts should con-
sider such a nominating committee favorably when asked to protect 
directors from liability because it furthers the goal of making direc-
tors independent of management. However, the new board should 
reject the proposal in the SEC staff report that this committee also 
evaluate "the performance of incumbent directors in determining 
whether to recommend them for re-election."73 
The power of certain directors to evaluate the other directors 
may reduce the quality of decision-making because it will "unpeer" 
the director group. Oliver Williamson has pointed out that experi-
ence-rating and monitoring by certain individuals creates a hierar-
chy rather than a peer group. He has also argued that peer groups 
punish individual malingering in one way or another, rendering for-
mal evaluation unnecessary.74 Recent corporate data tend indi-
rectly to support Williamson. In 1980, 12.7% of nominating 
committees had responsibility for evaluating incumbent directors. 
This percentage represents a thirty-two percent decrease in the 
number of nominating committees performing this function the year 
before.75 
If the board limits its evaluation to wholly superficial factors, 
such as frequency of attendance at meetings, it may not undermine 
equality. However, even this superficial function has now been 
taken over by the federal proxy rules. Under those rules, the annual 
proxy statement sent to shareholders must disclose the name of each 
72. Delaware has wisely stated that conferring such a power on co-directors would be a 
"dangerous precedent." See Bruch v. National Guar. Credit Corp., 13 Del. Ch. 180, 186-90, 
I 16 A. 738, 741-42 (1922). 
73. STAFF REPORT, supra note 16, at 526-27. 
74. 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 46, at 46, 49, 53. 
75. SEC 1980 Study, supra note 4, at 1554. 
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director attending fewer than seventy-five percent of the meetings of 
the board and assigned committees.76 
The last potential vestige of subtle management influence over 
the truly independent director - and a potential threat to peerage -
derives from the probability that the chief executive still initially 
selects the new independent director nominees.77 But it is also likely 
that the independent nominees now selected are persons friendly or 
known to both the independents and the chief executive.78 A recent 
survey found that an independent committee and not the chief exe·c-
utive now makes the "initial decisions in approving a prospective 
director,"79 but the survey did not ask who made the initial 
suggestion. 
The proposition that even the independent directors with no 
business or familial ties to management are nevertheless especially 
loyal or beholden to the chief executive because the chief executive 
was responsible for their nomination is unrealistic. As previously 
argued, 80 the independent director today serves by a slight "margin" 
of decision, not by a margin that commands special obedience or 
loyalty to the procurer. Finally, one should remember that a time 
lag separates structural and substantive change. The independent 
nominating committee is a recent structural change, and the recent 
data suggest that it is having a substantive effect. Soon structure will 
transform to substance. Those who have argued to the contrary rely 
on data rendered stale by more recent events.81 
76. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 1S384, 16 SEC DocKET 348 (Dec. 6, 1978). 
77. See THE NEW DIRECTOR, supra note 12, at 14 ("Most of the new directors (56%) were 
selected for a board on the basis of prior contact with management. . . ."). 
78. Of companies with sales volumes over $1 billion, 70% use the nominating committee, 
consisting of one inside and four outside directors, to locate outside directors for the new 
board. KORN/FERRY 1981, supra note 6, at 8, 22. In response to the survey question "How 
are outside directors located for the board?" the same Korn/Ferry report states the responses 
as follows: "Recommendation and known to chairman - 77.6%; Recommendation and 
known to board members - 77.3%." Id at 22. The fair inference from this is that the new 
nominees are known to both the chief executive and one or more independent directors. 
79. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES 1980, supra note 4, at 3. 
80. See text accompanying notes 60-63 supra. But see THE NEW DIRECTOR, supra note 12, 
at 14-1S. 
81. See Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 49, at 284 & nn.124, 125. Professors Coffee and 
Schwartz and others rely, in part, on the 1971 Heidrick & Struggles Profile of the Board of 
Directors which found that 37% of "the organizations participating reported having fired a 
director." HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, INC., PROFILE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 11 (1971). 
Because the 1971 Heidrick & Struggles questionnaire was sent to the chief executive of the 
participating corporations, commentators interpreting the above-quoted phrase concluded that 
the chief executive (rather than the board as a group) had removed the director. See Coffee & 
Schwartz, supra note 49, at 283 n.125; Note, The Business Judgment Rule in .Derivative Suits 
Against .Directors, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 600, 620 n.103 (1980). Neither the quotation nor the 
question posed by Heidrick & Struggles ("has a director of your company ever been 'fired'?") 
supports the commentators' conclusion. See Letter from Heidrick and Struggles, Inc. to Pro-
22 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 80:1 
Ill. PROMOTING HIGH-QUALITY DECISION-MAKING 
IN PEER GROUPS 
Many of the country's largest corporate entities have recently be-
gun to move toward peer group decision-making. By judiciously 
manipulating corporate law, the courts can further this trend. But all 
peer groups are not alike, and not every current corporate govern-
ance proposal is conducive to good decision-making. In this respect, 
the behavioral sciences can offer considerable guidance to legisla-
tures, courts, and the new boards. 
A. Group Cohesiveness and the New Board 
Group composition is an important factor in the quality of deci-
sion-making. As behavioral scientists confirm, an individual's per-
formance varies depending upon the other individuals in the 
group. 82 The degree to which members of a group are attracted to 
each other and to the group, and the morale of the group is called 
"cohesiveness." There is no direct evidence tying the degree of cohe-
siveness to an objective standard of excellence in decision-making, 
but Shaw has summarized the indirect evidence: 
[H]igh-cohesive groups are more effective than low-cohesive groups in 
achieving their goals. The cohesive group does whatever it tries to do 
better than the noncohesive group. 
. . . It follows that group problem solving should be facilitated by 
group cohesiveness. Despite some negative findings . . . the empirical 
fessor Robert J. Haft (July 14, 1981) (on file with the Michigan Law Review). The 1977 
Heidrick & Struggles Profile posed the same question and reports that the proportion of 
"boards" who have terminated a directorship by some means "has increased slightly since 
1971." HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES 1977, supra note 14, at 12. 
The distribution of "lackluster'' directors in the population may well be a constant, without 
bespeaking anything on the relative power today of the chief executive versus the new board 
over the independent directors. Other and more recent Heidrick & Struggles data is more 
significant. In their 1977 Profile, the chief executive was "[t]he initial decision maker regard-
ing a prospective director'' in 42.9% of companies with annual sales of $1 billion or more, all 
directors as a group in 29% and the nominating committee in 14% of these companies, 
HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES 1977, supra note 14, at 8. Their "1980 Update" indicates that a 
strong shift occurred between the 1977 and 1980 reports. The "initial decision-maker in ap-
proving board prospects" is now the nominating committee in 69% of companies with annual 
sales of$2 billion or more, all directors as a group in 6.4% and the chief executive in 16.7% of 
these companies. In companies with sales between $1 billion and $1.9 billion, the correspond-
ing figures were 43.5%, 10.9% and 34.8%. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES 1980, supra note 4, at 3. 
In all fairness to those who rely on the 1971 Heidrick & Struggles statistics, it must be 
recognized that they use that data in an entirely different context, and one which has been 
excepted from this author's proposals: the dismissal by directors of derivative suits against co-
directors (usually management). Behaviorally, it is much easier for the independents to criti-
cize the chief executive for a business proposal now before the board than to permit a large 
damage suit against him or her to go forward. 
82. See M. SHAW, supra note 23, at 211-13. 
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evidence generally supports this expectation.83 
Underlying cohesiveness is friendship. Groups of close friends 
solve problems more efficiently than do various friend-stranger 
groupings. Increased ease of communication is probably a major 
factor,84 as well as the readiness of individuals to be influenced by, to 
trust, and to respond positively to the actions of friends. 85 In fact, 
interpersonal trust has been confirmed as an essential precondition 
to effective group problem solving. 86 
Boards of directors can be very cohesive groups. Conflict among 
group members decreases cohesiveness when the dispute concerns 
principles; "however, when the group members agree on principles 
but are in disagreement over matters that assume adherence to those 
principles, the conflict enhances cohesiveness."87 The members of 
both the new and old boards have common objectives and values 
and agree on the principles applicable to the largest private aggrega-
tions of economic power because they are drawn from the very same 
socioeconomic group. And "membership in a persistently high sta-
tus group" also promotes cohesiveness88 - a finding particularly ap-
plicable to the boards of our larg~st corporations. Certain 
governance and liability proposals, however, may undermine the 
board's cohesiveness, and reduce the quality of its de9isions. 
1. Constituency Directors 
The empirical findings support the nearly universal rejection of 
the idea of appointing directors to "represent" different corporate 
83. Id. at 225, 395 (citations omitted). See A. HARE, HANDBOOK OF SMALL GROUP RE-
SEARCH 340 (2d ed. 1976). However, Hare points out that friends can also agree to malinger: 
"A slowdown may also occur if the group members conspire to lower the output. The efforts 
of the group to impose a slowdown will be more effective if the group members are highly 
congenial." Id. at 209 (citation omitted). 
84. A. HARE, supra note 83, at 209. See Donahue, Hawes & Mabee, Testing a Structural-
Functional Model of Group Decision Making Using Markov Analysis, 7 HUMAN COMMUNICA-
TIONS RESEARCH 133-46 (1981). 
85. See M. OLMSTED & A. HARE, supra note 39, at 68-70; M. SHAW, supra note 23, at 215. 
For an example of a study showing that compatibility among group members leads to more 
rapid problem solving, see Reddy & Byrnes, Effects of Interpersonal Group Composition on the 
Problem-Solving Behavior of Middle Managers, 56 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 516, 517 (1972). 
86. Zand, Trust and Managerial Problem Solving, 17 Ao. Set. Q. 229, 238 (1972). An ex-
cellent review of the empirical evidence concerning trust in experimental and natural groups 
and in organizations is contained in Golembiewski & McConkie, The Centrality of Interper-
sonal Trust in Group Processes, in THEORIES OF GROUP PROCESSES 131, 156-78 (C. Cooper ed. 
1975). Trust and distrust are "spirally reinforced," ie., trust leads to ever more trust, and 
distrust leads to ever more distrust. Id. at 139, 175. 
87. M. SHAW, supra note 23, at 215. See Sole, Marton & Hornstein, Opinion Similarity and 
Helping: Three Field Experiments Investigating the Bases of Promotive Tension, 11 J. EXPERI-
MENTAL Soc. PSYCH. l (1975). 
88. M. OLMSTED & A. HARE, supra note 39, at 113. 
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"constituencies," such as employees or consumers.89 Alvin Zander 
cited empirical evidence that "an adversary relationship among 
members" derogates from the quality of decision-making. Each 
member tries to persuade the representatives of other constituencies, 
but does not accept their influence: "The oral contributions are no 
more useful than no comments at all."90 Barnlund, who analyzed 
group superiority, found that two factors accounted for a majority of 
the group errors in his experiments. One factor was that groups 
faced with intense disagreement either compromised on a third solu-
tion or the "less aggressive members" surrendered to the other fac-
tion. "Apparently disagreement stimulates thought up to a point; 
beyond that point, groups may lack the patience and skill to exploit 
it."91 In a more recent empirical study comparing the quality of de-
cisions by groups with "representatives" with decisions of other 
groups, the representative groups made lower quality decisions.92 
But if the various constituencies must "accept" the group decision, 
then representatives must be included in the group, adversely affect-
ing decision "quality."93 
2. Cumulative Voting 
Cumulative voting for directors also leads to directors as repre-
sentatives, in this case, of different shareholder constituencies. 
Shareholders with large holdings are given the opportunity to gain 
representation on the board in proportion to t~eir holdings.94 Seven-
teen states currently mandate cumulative voting, and about thirty 
states permit it.95 Although forceful arguments have been made for 
and against cumulative voting,96 the cohesiveness findings suggest 
that shareholder representatives, like other constituency representa-
tives, would detract from quality decision-making. 
89. See STAFF REPORT, note 16 supra, at 459-68. 
90. A. ZANDER, supra note 46, at 78. 
91. Barnlund, supra note 32, at 59. 
92. Stumpf, Freedman & Zand, Judgmental .Decisions: A Study of Interactions Among 
Group Membership, Group Functioning, and the .Decision Situation, 22 ACAD. MoT. J. 765, 769 
(1979). 
93. Id But the constituency form of decision-making is precisely the type engaged in by 
the various corporate coalitions and organizational subunits below the board and the chief 
executive in maintaining operations. See note 43 supra. 
94. W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 258-59 (5th ed. 
unabr. 1980). 
95. Id at 260. 
96. Id 
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3. Recent SEC Proxy Amendments 
The .SEC has recently amended the federal proxy rules to facili-
tate voting on each director individually.97 Now shareholders have 
the opportunity not to vote for a particular director while voting in 
favor of the rest of the slate of nominees. A shareholder can still 
conform to the traditional practice of voting the entire director slate 
either up or down,98 but prior to the amendment the typical form of 
proxy provided by companies impeded shareholders who wanted to 
cast a vote for or againsf an individual director. Another recent 
amendment requires public disclosure of the votes cast by sharehold-
ers concerning an individual director who was elected but received 
five percent or more negative or withheld votes.99 Although these 
amendments may further "shareholder democracy'' in the election of 
directors of very large corporations - a dubious proposition - they 
may be counterproductive to the cohesiveness of the new board by 
making the performance of individual directors an electoral issue. 
The SEC received many negative comments on this rule: 
Many commentators believed that rulemaking in the area of corporate 
accountability should focus on strengthening the independent role of 
the board, as well as the structure of the board and its committee sys-
tem, rather than unduly politicizing the corporate electoral process 
through a. provision for individual voting. Others commented that 
when shareholders vote for directors, they are voting for or against the 
board as a cohesive managing body and have little interest in individ-
ual nominees.100 
'Fhe SEC did not directly respond to these perceptive comments. It 
has failed in these instances correctly to resolve the tensions between 
certain outdated notions of shareholder democracy in the very large 
corporation and conditions conducive to high-quality decisions by 
the new board. 
4. Liability Distinctions Among Directors 
Some cases have drawn liability or burden of proof distinctions 
among directors. In the case of decision-making by the board and 
true group tasks undertaken by the new board, such as the review of 
a securities registration statement or proxy statement, the standard of 
97. Rule 14a-4(b)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14-4(b)(2) (1980). See Securities Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 16356, 18 SEC DocKET 997, 998-1000 (Nov. 23, 1979). 
98. Voting "down" an entire slate occurs in a proxy fight between two factions or in a 
takeover struggle in which each side proposes its own full board slate. 
99. Schedule 14A, Item 6(g)(l), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14A-101 (1980). See 18 SEC DOCKET, 
supra note 97, at 999. 
100. 18 SEC DocKET, supra note 97, at 999. 
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liability should be uniform as to all directors. 101 The courts should 
promote group cohesiveness and discourage individual strategic be-
havior. Individualized definitions of due care and directorial duty 
are inconsistent with this goal. The obvious exceptions are instances 
in which a director, usually from management, has practiced fraud 
upon the group itself, by failing to disclose facts that he knows are 
important to the group task and unknown to the others, and in-
stances in which a particular director has a personal interest in con-
flict with the group activity. The "actual fraud" exception recognizes 
that act most destructive of group cohesiveness - disloyalty to the 
group itself. In the typical conflict of interest case, the law already 
requires the interested director to disclose the conflict and withdraw 
from that specific group decision. 102 
Some cases have distinguished directors who are inside officers 
from directors who are not. 103 To the extent that the courts believed 
the insiders knew the damning facts but did not tell the outsiders, the 
distinction approximates the disloyalty to the group exception. Un-
less a particular director had actual knowledge, however, no distinc-
tions based on supposed inequalities of access to information or of 
relevant expertise among the directors as such 104 should be made. 
The famous Delaware case of Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. 105 
refused to draw any liability distinctions among directors for group 
conduct - either the group was liable or not. The court held the 
board not liable on the ground that the board had no duty to investi-
101. In twenty-eight states, common law defines the duty of care of directors. Twenty-two 
states have statutory definitions. The common law jurisdictions obviously can make the stan-
dard uniform, through judicial decisions. So can the statutory jurisdictions because most pro-
vide a uniform and objective standard, absent actual individual knowledge of impropriety 
("good faith"). Although the language of the uniform standard varies from statute to statute, 
most are similar to section 35 of the Model Business Corporation Act: "[W)ith such care as an 
ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances." Guide-
book, supra note 5, at 1631. But see id at 1601, in which the ABA committee "recognizes that 
the special background and qualifications of a particular director • . . may place greater re-
sponsibility on that director." 
102. See w. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 94, at 565-86, 600-06. A few states still 
adhere to the old view that a transaction between a director and the corporation is voidable 
even if fair. Id at 583-84; N. LATTIN, supra note 57, § 80, at 291 n.67. See Bulbulia & Pinto, 
Statutory Responses to Interested .Directors' Transactions: A Watering .Down of Fiduciary Stan-
dards?, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 201, 204-05 (1977); Buxbaum, Conflict-of-Interest Statutes and 
the Need far a .Demand on .Directors in .Derivative Actions, 68 CALIF, L. REV. 1122 (1980), 
103. See-Bates v. Dresser, 251 U.S. 524, 529-30 (1920); w. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra 
note 94, at 535-36. 
104. If management as such should have informational duties to the new board, the courts 
should handle the prpblem directly. The last part of the Article proposes that this duty be 
placed on key management as such, and that the informational duties imposed by present law 
on directors as such be removed or strongly diluted. See notes 244-57 infra and accompanying 
text. 
105. 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963). 
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gate whether the employees were engaged in illegal acts, absent some 
tangible warning signs to the board. The case has been criticized on 
the basis of its narrow view of board duties, but its group approach 
to the issue is not counterproductive of cohesiveness. 
Certain liability distinctions among directors may be justified by 
policies that outweigh the promotion of high-quality decisions 
through group cohesiveness. For example, the incentive to serve ra-
tionale, which, as previously argued, should provide the truly in-
dependent directors with an almost absolute business judgment 
defense, leaves open the possibility of denying these benefits to man-
agement directors. Such a distinction would serve the currently 
more important goal of encouraging the selection of truly independ-
ent directors for the boards of the very largest corporations. And the 
findings that peer groups make better decisions than do individuals 
and nonpeer groups are more extensive and clear than the findings 
that link the cohesiveness of the group with the quality of its per-
formance. Put to choices, therefore, the courts should continue to 
distinguish among directors based upon true independence to pro-
mote collegial decision-making among equals, though group cohe-
siveness may thereby diminish. No substantial behavioral case, 
however, can be made for distinctions among the independent direc-
tors, absent the unlikely event of actual fraud or clearly illegal action 
by one of these directors. 
The federal courts have imposed civil damage liability upon di-
rectors under provisions of the federal securities laws, such as ruJ.es 
lOb-5 and 14a-9 of the 1934 Act and section 1 r of the 1933 Act. The 
federal cases have overanalyzed the behavior of individual directors, 
and, in so doing, have failed or been unwilling to recognize that 
board activities are essentially group activities, not the sum total of 
individual acts. To the extent that legal rules place different pres-
sures on different members of a group with the same group goal, 
group cohesiveness may diminish. And when the stakes of a deci-
sion are different for different individuals in the group, coalitions 
may form or individual strategic behavior detrimental to high-quali-
ty decisions may occur.106 
106. The economic stakes of business decisions are different for the inside senior executives 
on the board than for the independent directors. A perceptive and experienced group of in-
dependent directors will properly "discount" the self-interest of the insiders when making 
business decisions. But the independent directors cannot "discount" for the relative accuracy 
or inaccuracy of the information upon which the decision is based. "[T)he amount, quality, 
and structure of the information that reaches the board is almost wholly within the control of 
the corporation's executives. . . . [T]his kind of power over information flow is virtually 
equivalent to power over decision." Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the 
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For example, section 11 of the 1933 Act imposes huge liabilities 
on every director who fails to exercise due diligence concerning the 
accuracy of the registration statement used to sell securities. Its lan-
guage weakly suggests, but clearly does not compel, an interpretation 
requiring the court to evaluate the diligence of each individual direc-
tor, rather than the diligence exercised by the board as a whole. 107 
Yet, iri the only two cases that examined directors' duties under sec-
tion 11, both courts stressed the liability of the particular director 
based on his particular actions and inactions and his particular back-
ground and experience.108 Although each court held all of the direc-
tors liable, neither court analyzed the director group's failure 
reasonably to reach its one clear group goal - an accurate registra-
tion statement. A registration statement is a group effort, involving 
the directors, lawyers, accountants, officers, and others. The implicit 
suggestion of both cases - that someday, one director may be held 
liable and another exonerated - may be counterproductive both to 
the overall quality of board decision-making and to group prepara-
tion of an accurate registration statement. 
The SEC has reinforced this individualized approach to the 
board in various public reports relating to the bankruptcies of cer-
t_ain corporations. For example, in its reports on Stirling Homex, 
Penn Central, and National Telephone, the SEC strongly criticized 
the actions and inactions of particular directors. 109 These directors 
were understandably unable to overcome the board's norms. The 
hope that one director will courageously rise above the group is un-
realistic, particularly in a cohesive group. 
Modem Corporation: Officers, Directors and Accountants, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 375, 380 (1975) 
(footnote omitted). 
107. Section 11 provides in relevant part: 
[N]o person . . . shall be liable • • • who shall sustain the burden of proof. • . that • • • 
he had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe • • • 
that [the registration statement was accurate] •••• 
In determining . . • what constitutes reasonable investigation and reasonable ground 
for belief, the standard of reasonableness shall be that required of a prudent man in the 
management of his own property. 
15 U.S.C. §§ 77K(b)(3)(A), 77K(c) (1976). 
108. Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Es-
cott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
109. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11,516, 7 SEC DocKET 298 (July 2, 1975) (Stir-
ling Homex Corp.); SEC STAFF REPORT, THE FINANCIAL COLLAPSE OF THE PENN CENTRAL 
COMPANY, printed far the use of SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIOATIONS OF THE HOUSE 
COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FORElON COMMERCE, 93d Cong., 2d. Sess. 151-72 (1972); Securi-
ties Exchange Act Release No. 14380, 13 SEC DOCKET 1393 (Jan. 16, 1978) (National Tele-
phone Co., Inc.). 
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5. Continuity of Board Membership 
Continuity of association among group members, like that 
among friends, promotes group cohesiveness, and thus promotes 
high-quality group decisions as well. 110 With very high cohesive-
ness, however, a counterproductive tendency toward conformity of 
opinion develops - "groupthink."111 The old board was probably 
too cohesive and in-bred, 112 dominated as it was by the company's 
executives who worked together on a daily basis under the leader-
ship of the chief executive. The new board may well strike a fine 
balance between incest and indifference among group members. It 
meets almost monthly as a full board, and each director also meets 
about six times a year in small committee groupings; more meetings 
and more group work appear to be the trend.113 Add to this the 
likelihood that the independents have other social connections with 
each other, and the board has the makings of a cohesive group that 
avoids the evils of groupthink. 
As in the case of cumulative voting, tensions exist between cer-
tain notions of "shareholder democracy'' and quality decisions by 
the new board. All states require the election of some directors an-
nually, thus introducing at least the possibility of constant turnover 
in the boardroom. However, continuity of the director group in the 
large corporation persisted in the past, primarily because of manage-
110. A. HARE, supra note 83, at 330-32, 340. 
111. See M. SHAW, supra note 23, at 218-22. See, e.g., Cartwright & Zander, Pressures to 
Un!formity in Groups: Introduction, in GROUP DYNAMICS 139, 147 (D. Cartwright & A. 
Zander eds. 3d ed. 1968). Irving Janis wrote: "I use the term 'groupthink' as a quick and easy 
way to refer to a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a 
cohesive in-group, when the members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to 
realistically appraise alternative courses of actions." I. JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK 9 
(1972). 
112. Group cohesiveness promotes the development of attitudes among members of in-
group superiority ("group egocentrism") as contrasted with other groups. See, e.g., I. JANIS, 
supra note ll I, at 197, 203-04 ("shared illusion of invulnerability"); Myers & Bach, Group 
J)iscussion Effects on Conflict Behavior and Se!f-Just!ftcation, 38 PSYCH. REP. 135, 135 (1976) 
(competition with other groups enhances these attitudes). 
An empirical study suggests that in terms of economic measures of performance, the pro-
portion of outside directors is ofno significance. J. PENNINGS, INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES 
154-55 (1980). In fact, 
[t]irms that have permitted a greater influx of outside directors have a slight tendency to 
lower performance levels, but the relationships are insignificant for most of the effective-
ness indicators • . . • From the results . . • 1t appears that boards dominated by insiders 
benefit from their cohesiveness rather than suffer from groupthink. However, . . . the 
coefficients are extraordinarily small . . . . 
Id 
I 13. Boards of companies with annual sales of between $1 billion and $5 billion meet 
between eight and ten times per year. Each committee meets at least twice during the year, 
with many meeting an average of four to six times per year. KORN/FERRY 1981, supra note 6, 
at 12, 19. 
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ment's control of the proxy machinery and its domination of the 
board. The nominating committee of the new board has largely re-
placed the chief executive as the keeper of proxy machinery. Thus, 
the new board's independent directors will preserve continuity of 
board membership. 
Continuity can be structurally furthered by providing for the 
classification of directors, with staggered terms of two or more years 
for each director. Each year only a number, but fewer than a major-
ity, of the directors are up for election. Most states permit this by 
statute.114 Although subject to potential abuse in limited circum-
stances, 115 classification promotes cohesion and continuity and may 
be especially helpful during the present "shake-out" or transition pe-
riod for the new board.116 
B. Other Conditions for High-Quality Decisions 
This Article has presented evidence that, all other things being 
equal, peer groups make higher quality decisions than do individuals 
or nonpeer groups, and that group cohesiveness is an important fac-
tor in quality decision-making. Obviously many variables affect 
group decision-making. 117 But two matters receive particular em-
114. A. FREY, J. CHOPER, N. LEECH & C. MORRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORA· 
TIONS 417 (2d ed. 1977). 
115. Id 
116. Id Although highly unlikely, it would follow that if the portion of directors up for 
election in the very largest corporations are defeated, the entire "cohesive" board should then 
resign. "The largest industrials do not use this device as frequently (as smaller industrials), In 
fact, the proportion of premier size industrials staggering terms has declined from 13.9 percent 
to 11.2 percent over the past five years." HEIDRICK & STRUOOLES 1977, supra note 14, at I I. 
Cf. Schotland, Conclusions and Recommendations, in ABUSE ON WALL STREET 565, 576 (1980) 
(Twentieth Century Fund Report) (The unaffiliated directors of pension funds and other non-
profit institutions should have "terms at least as long as (and preferably longer than) the terms 
of other directors; otherwise, unaffiliated directors may be tempted to sacrifice their indepen-
dence to retain their directorships."). 
117. The variables researched include noise, member proximity, seating arrangements, and 
other factors which affect communication networks. See A. HARE, supra note 83, at 260-77, 
343-44; M. SHAW, supra note 23, at 118-66, 392-93. Research has also been done on the effects 
of type of task, leadership behavior and individual personality on group problem solving. See 
A. HARE, supra note 83, at 330-56; M. SHAW, supra note 23, at 315-89. The Article does not 
discuss these variables because each either is unlikely to affect board decision-making or, as in 
the case of individual personality, is far too complex for researchers to have even established 
base principles at this time. 
Should group composition be homogeneous or heterogeneous? One aspect of this question, 
focusing on individual abilities, is fiat and obvious; other aspects, dealing with race and with 
gender, are explosive. Groups composed of members having diverse but relevant abilities per-
form more effectively than groups composed of members having similar abilities. M. SHA w, 
supra note 23, at 259. Heterogeneity with respect to personality characteristics also appears to 
facilitate group problem solving. See id at 395; Hoffman, Homogeneity of Member Personoli't 
and its Effect on Group Problem-Solving, 58 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCH. 27, 31 (1959) (expen-
mental "results imply that a multiplicity of perceptions of a problem are productive of creative 
solutions"); Hoffman, Harburg & Maier, Differences and Disagreement as Factors in Creative 
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phasis in the behavioral literature. First, is there an optimal group 
Group Problem Solving, 64 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCH. 206 (1962); Hoffman & Maier, Quali-
ty and Acceptance of Problem Solutions by Members of Homeogeneous and Heterogeneous 
Groups, 62 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCH. 401 (1961); Pelz, Some Social Factors Related to 
Pe,formance in a Research Organization, l Ao. Sci. Q. 310 (1956) (performance of research 
scientists benefited from frequent association with colleagues having a variety of values, exper-
iences and disciplines). The evidence becomes equivocal and inadequate past this obvious 
point. Shaw states: 
Although there are some negative results, the bulk of the evidence suggests that groups 
that are compatible with respect to needs and personality characteristics are able to . . . 
achieve their goals more effectively than groups whose members are incompatible with 
respect to needs and personality characteristics. 
M. SHA w, supra note 23, at 258. See Schutz, What Makes Groups Productive?, 6 HUMAN REL. 
429, 454-55 (1955) (compatible groups utilize their resources more effectively than other 
groups). However, Shaw points out that compatibility is a vague concept and that the tools for 
measuring it are crude. See M. SHA w, supra note 23, at 260. 
Shaw refers to only one study that questions whether mixed-sex groups are more effective 
than homogeneous groups. That study, reported in 1978, involved a management task requir-
ing the group to decide the correct placement of six trainees. Each group had a leader and two 
followers. Group performance was measured by the time required to complete the task. Het-
erogeneous groups performed better than homogeneous groups with both male and female 
leaders. Shaw suggests that this study may have limited relevance because the differences may 
have been the result of the differential behavior of leaders in mixed-sex and same-sex groups. 
M. SHAW, supra note 23, at 246, 259. 
In the past decade, a number of studies attempted to measure the efficiency of racially 
mixed groups and racially homogeneous groups. None of these studies involved measurement 
of the quality of decision-making by the different groups. Efficiency was measured by the 
relative time required to complete simple tasks. In some of the studies, the racially mixed 
groups took more time to complete these tasks. The only reliable finding is that the racial 
composition of the group influenced the feelings and behaviors of group members, with some 
evidence that the tension created in the racially mixed groups inhibited effective group interac-
tion. Id at 249-51. The evidence is not only extremely limited, but the differences, in the 
words of Shaw, "may or may not adversely affect group performance." Id at 260. Further, 
both the gender and race research consisted of laboratory experiments with college students 
and field observations of blue-collar workers conducted some years ago. This would appear to 
have little or no relevance to the manner in which the composition of the board of directors 
affects the quality of decision-making. 
Some commentators have expressed their concern that a board contain a diversity of points 
of view and a sensitivity to different issues and different shareholder interests. However, most 
commentators supporting director diversity do not support constituency directorships. See 
STAFF REPORT, supra note 16, at 459-68. . 
Variety is the spice of directorial decisions. The SEC Staff Report states: 
Ralph Lazarus representing the Business Roundtable noted: "You don't want a mono-
lithic board; you want a board that's made up of different backgrounds." The Business 
Roundtable Statement on ''The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the 
Large Publicly Owned Corporation" also endorses the importance of seeking directors 
from outside the business community. Similarly, another commentator noted: "With a 
requisite degree of independence, all members of the board will feel a compulsion to take 
initiatives and espouse special causes from time to time, and not always the same cause. 
This is true of all who are worthy of board membership, regardless of sex, race, religious 
background, or other distinction. Indeed, there is a positive advantage in having board 
members with diverse experiences and qackgrounds, who are capable of relating them to 
the corporate interest. The character of the individual is what is really paramount." 
Id at 467 (emphasis in original; footnotes omitted) (quoting C. BROWN, PUTTING THE CORPO-
RATE BOARD TO WORK 117 (1976)). The Heidrick and Struggles survey of the 1300 largest 
corporations reported: "[N)early three-quarters of the organizations report no members of a 
racial or ethnic minority as board members, and 68 percent of the companies have no women 
directors." ~EIDRICK & STRUGGLES, INC., THE CHANGING BOARD 1979 UPDATE 4 (1979). 
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size for decision-making? Second, which decision rule is preferable 
- consensus or majority rule? 
1. Group Size 
The size of the group obviously influences its performance. 118 
The range of resources available to the group increases with group 
size, as does the probability that the group will contain at least one 
member capable of performing the task. But relatively fewer group 
members then participate, forming subgroups as a result. 119 Thelen 
suggested the "principle of least group size": just large enough to 
include individuals with all the relevant skills for problem solu-
tion.120 Bales reported that the optimum group size in his group de-
cision experiments was five. 121 Slater found five to be the optimum 
size when individual member "satisfaction" with the intellectual task 
of the group is an important criterion.122 Subjective satisfaction with 
118. See Steiner, Models far Infilling Relations/tips Between Group Size and Potential 
Group Productivity, 11 BEHAVIORAL SCI. 273 (1966). 
119. M. SHAW, supra note 23, at 168-69. See Bales, The Equilibrium Problem in Small 
Groups, in WORKING PAPERS IN THE THEORY OF ACTION 111, 131-32 (1953). 
120. See Thelen, Group .Dynamics in Instruction: Principle ef Least Group Size, 57 SCHOOL 
REv. 139 (1949), cited in M. SHAW, supra note 23, at 243. 
121. See Bales, In Conference, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1954, at 44, 48. (reporting 
results of experiments at the Harvard Laboratory of Social Relations). 
122. See A. HARE, supra note 83, at 229; Slater, Contrasting Correlates ef Group Size, 21 
SOCIOMETRY 129 (1958). 
The Supreme Court has indirectly dealt with the question of "optimal" group size in a 
different context: jury size. In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), it held that a six-
member jury satisfies the constitutional guarantee of a jury in a state criminal trial. The Court 
relied on empirical studies and theoretical writings. 399 U.S. at 101 nn.48 & 49. A new set of 
studies was cited in the later opinions concerning jury size. See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 
149, 158-60 & n.15 (1973); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 231-39 & nn.10-32, 243-44 nn.34-
37 & 39-41 (1978) (plurality opinion) (Blackmun, J.). Ballew held that a five-member jury did 
not satisfy the constitutional requirement in a state criminal trial. See generally Lermack, No 
Right Number? Social Science Research and the Jury-Size Cases, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 951, 963 
(1979) (Justice Blackmun did not differentiate between empirical and nonempirical work and 
the studies he cited do not support his conclusions); Nagel, Value Reinforcement as a Key to 
Policy Research Utilization, in THE UsE-NONUSE-MISUSE OF APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH 
IN THE COURTS 106, 106-09 (1980) (criticizing Justice Blackmun's "selective" use and citation 
of the author's research model for Type I errors - convicting the innocent - and Type II 
errors - not convicting the guilty); Kaye, And Then There Were Twelve: Statistical Reasoning, 
the Supreme Court, and the Size efthe Jury, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 1004, 1019-20 (1980). 
Justice Blackmun in Ballew states: "When individual and group decisionmaking were 
compared, it was seen that groups performed better because prejudices of individuals were 
frequently counterbalanced, and objectivity resulted. Groups also exhibited increased motiva-
tion and self-criticism." 435 U.S. at 233. Justice Blackmun cited Bamlund in support of the 
statement. 435 U.S. at 233 n.15 (citing Lempert, Uncovering "Nondiscemible" .D!lferences: 
Empirical Research and the Jury Size Cases, 13 MICH. L. R.Ev. 644, 687-88 (1975) (citing 
Barnlund, supra note 32, at 58-59)). These findings have not been challenged, to the author's 
knowledge, in the still-raging debate among scholars on the jury size issue. The optimum jury 
size issue implicates other values besides accuracy and quality, such as the value of having a 
representative cross-section of the community on a state criminal jury. One might logically 
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the task is an incentive that a board should offer to attract independ-
ent directors. 
The growing use of committees to make certain board decisions 
will promote high-quality decision-making. The average size of a 
board committee in the large corporation is five. 123 The various state 
statutes permitting full delegation of the board's powers to a commit-
tee and the uniform acceptance by the courts of committee decisions 
as the equivalent of board decisions are likewise consistent with the 
goal of high-quality group decisions. 
2. .Decision by Consensus 
The decision rule employed by a group affects the quality of its 
decisions. The empirical evidence strongly suggests that a consensus 
decision rule leads to higher quality decisions than majority rule. 
Studies by Hall and Watson and by Nemirofffound that groups that 
decided by consensus made higher quality decisions in the NASA 
Moon Survival Problem.124 The instructions to the "consensus" 
groups did not require unanimous concurrence on each aspect of the 
complex problem, but suggested that the group not limit discussion 
solely to that sufficient to reach a simple majority vote. Other groups 
operated on the majority vote principle. The researchers attributed 
the superior results of the consensus groups to the fact that the con-
sensus rule forced the groups to recognize and deal with differences 
of opinion rather than to deny or ignore them. Nemiroff concluded 
rather firmly that consensus is the best decision rule for a peer 
group.12s . 
urge this ''value" in the corporate context, see, e.g., note 89 supra (discussing "constituency" 
directors), but it has no bearing on qualitative excellence in business decisions. 
Consideration has recently been given to group decision-making by appellate courts. See 
Jones, Multitude of Counsellors: Appel/ale Adjudicalion as Group .Decision-Making, 54 TULANE 
L. REV. 541, 553-55 (1980). 
123. See KORN/FERRY 1981, supra note 6, at 12. 
124. See notes 35-36 supra. 
125. See Nemiroff, supra note 36, at 2. See also Robertson, Small Group .Decision Making.· 
17ze Uncertain Role of Information in Reducing Uncertainty, 2 POL. BEHAVIOR 163, 163 (1980) 
(a consensus rule will increase search activity, but if the result is informational overload, the 
group will be uncertain about its decisions).. Mathematical models have been devised and 
computer simulations used to compare decision outcomes under simple majority rules and 
other decision rules. See A. HARE, supra note 83, at 344-54. If majority rule is binding, coali-
tions may develop in the group. The opportunities for a combination of two or more minori-
ties in opposition to a leading proposal must then be explored. Many theoretical and empirical 
articles analyze the formation and maintenance of coalitions. See, e.g., Komorita & Chertkoff, 
A Bargaining Theory of Coalition Formation, 80 (No. 3) PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 149 (1973). 
Many are based on various "game" theories, which make behavioral assumptions as to how 
persons "should" act - i.e., rationally and with individual optimization in mind. These stud-
ies as well as the bargaining theories are beyond the scope of this Article. 
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Decision by consensus is a long standing rule in the non-Western 
world, particularly in villages and small groups.126 Japanese manag-
ers decide by consensus in large business organizations.127 No votes 
are taken, but all views are considered until a solution can be found 
that incorporates the concerns of all members. Hare conducted a 
field study of the Quakers, who have used the consensus method for 
over 300 years. He found the method effective when the group is 
highly cohesive and shares "common values." 128 Since the new 
board, like the old, agrees on common values, the empirical evidence 
supports the use of a consensus decision rule, and not a majority 
rule, to achieve high-quality decisions. 129 
However, a legal requirement that the board reach its decisions 
by consensus would be counterproductive. Such a requirement 
might cause boards to reach compromise solutions rather than find 
solutions of the highest quality, or to embrace all points of view by 
leaving final decisions intentionally vague.130 When the board states 
its decision in vague terms, it passes the real decision to the officers 
who implement it, in effect delegating decision-making to the chief 
executive.131 Furthermore, the imposition of a consensus rule on the 
average thirteen-person board in the large corporation might make 
bona fide decision-making practically impossible. Based on the 
available evidence on peer-group decisions, optimum group size, and 
consensus decisions, however, the courts should accord the greatest 
126. A. HARE, supra note 83, at 345. 
127. See Drucker, 'What We Can Learn From Japanese Management, HARV. Bus. REV., 
Mar.-Apr. 1971, at 110, 111-13. But cf. Pascale, Communication and .Decision Making Across 
Cultures: Japanese and American Comparisons, 91 Ao. Sci. Q. 91 (1978) (Managers of 
Japanese firms were not found to utilize a consultative decision-making process more exten-
sively than American managers do, which finding did not contradict Drucker's point that Jap• 
anese managers spend more time than Americans defining the issues before supplying the 
answer). See generally w. MONROE & E. SAKAKIBARA, THE JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 
13 (1977); Japanese Management Style Wins Converts, INDUS. WEEK, April 16, 1979, at 19; 
Japanese Managers Tell How Their System Works, FORTUNE, Nov. 1977, at 126; Ueda & 
Craighead, Patience in Human Relations: Key to .Doing Business in Japan, MOT, REV,, Oct. 
1978, at 57. 
128. A. P.ARE, supra note 83, at 345. 
129. This data has been collected by behavioral scientists observing people in groups. The 
mathematical models and computer simulations may in the future point in a different direc-
tion, but their assumptions with respect to human behavior and their applications of power 
and game theories will have to be more closely examined. This body of literature has distinc-
tive relevance to business organizations. It requires further consideration. For example, the 
studies of coalitions in small groups are relevant to the problems of close corporations and 
partnerships. 
130. See G. ALLISON, EsSENCE OF DECISION 178 (1971); R. MACK, PLANNING ON UNCER· 
TAINTY 130 (1971) ("Uncertainty can make coalitions possible which clarity would disrupt."), 
131. See Note, .Decisionmaking Models and the Control of Corporate Crime, 85 YALE L.J. 
1091, 1104 (1976). See generally Hoffman, The Beginnings of a Hierarchical Model of Group 
Problem-Solving, in THE GROUP PROBLEM-SOLVING PROCESS 157 (1979). 
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possible deference to a consensus business decision by a five-person 
independent committee.132 
C. Conditions That Impede High-Quality Group .Decisions 
Janis tells the story of Alfred Sloan, the former chairman of Gen-
eral Motors, who reportedly announced at a meeting: 
Gentlemen, I take it we are all in complete agreement on the deci-
sion here. . . . Then I propose we postpone further discussion of this 
matter until our next meeting to give ourselves time to develop disa-
greement and perhaps gain some understanding of what the decision is 
all about. 133 
In seeking to determine the causes of incorrect group decisions, 
Barnlund recognized the malevolent group dynamics that Sloan 
tried to avoid: "[G]roup members agreed immediately and unani-
mously upon the wrong answer to a problem. Further study of the 
issue was then considered unnecessary and wasteful. . . . Agree-
ment [became] the criterion of correctness."134 A recent case history 
of a company's faulty acquisition of another business on the strong 
recommendation of the chief executive reveals similar decision-mak-
ing problems. Although the company's board had prestigious and 
conscientious independent directors and had received advance infor-
mation, the directors did not realize that other directors shared their 
negative opinions or that senior management, except for the chief 
executive, opposed the acquisition, and they did not wish to provoke 
conflict with the new chief executive. 135 
The studies of group behavior have identified two principal 
causes of faulty group decisions - group pressure toward conform-
ity of opinion and unexpressed and subtle group dynamics that 
speed up the decision process. After evaluating the behavioral sci-
ence evidence, this section discusses various techniques for counter-
acting harmful dynamics and the appropriate judicial incentives to 
adopt these techniques. 
1. Conformity Pressures 
We have all experienced the pressures toward conformity in a 
group. Groups do not encourage dissent. This is intuitively obvious, 
and as the social scientists are wont to do, they replicated the obvi-
132. See note 49 supra and accompanying text 
133. I. JANIS, supra note lll, at 218-19. 
134. Barnlund, supra note 32, at 59. 
135. Levy, Reforming Board Reform, HARV. Bus. REv., Jan.-Feb. 1981, at 166. 
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ous in many experimental studies during the 1950s.136 Janis coined 
the word "groupthink" to dramatize the point, 137 and the famous 
experiments of Solomon Asch, 138 a Gestalt psychologist, engendered 
hundreds of experiments and articles on the subject of conformity. 
Asch had his subjects look at lines of different lengths. Each individ-
ual merely had to state that one line was longer than the others. The 
experimenter's confederates unanimously gave the wrong answer, 
and nearly thirty-seven percent of the experimental subjects con-
formed with the confederates. Later experiments by others demon-
strated that conformity pressures increased with the use of complex 
problems involving subjective judgments and with the increasing at-
tractiveness of the group to the individual subjects. 139 
Of the many empirically identified variables that influenced con-
formity to the majority, the most powerful variable was the degree of 
ambiguity and uncertainty in the problem. The greater the ambigu-
ity and uncertainty, the greater the conformity of the individual to 
majority judgment. Asch's experiment represents the least ambigu-
ous situation -judging which line is longer than the others. Sherif s 
experiments involved the movement of light under very ambiguous 
conditions (the "autokinetic effect"); approximately eight out of 
every ten persons yielded to unanimous group decisions. 140 Other 
experiments have confirmed that the degree of conformity corre-
sponds closely to the degree of ambiguity involved. 141 
Pressures toward conformity thus appear greatest in the very ar-
eas where the board of directors operates. Analysis of the inf orma-
tion upon which major business decisions are to be based, of the 
choices considered, and of the potential consequences of the decision 
is complex, ambiguous, and uncertain. And, findings suggest that 
conformity is greater in ongoing than in temporary groups. 142 
136. For a summary of these studies, see A. HARE, supra note 83, at 19-59; M. OLMSTED & 
A. HARE,supra note 39, at 114; M. SHAw,supra note 23, at 280-93. For a general discussion of 
the field, see Cartwright & Zander, Pressures to lln!formity in Groups: Introduction, in GROUP 
DYNAMICS 139 (3d ed. 1968). 
137. See note Ill supra. 
138. See Asch, Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and J)islorlion of Judg-
ments, in READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2 (rev. ed. 1952); Asch, Opinions and Social Pres-
sure, ScI. AM., Nov. 1955, at 31. 
139. See, e.g., Brehm & Mann, Effect of Importance of Freedom and Allraction lo Group 
Members on I'!fluence Produced by Group Pressure, 31 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCH. 816 
(1975). 
140. M. SHERIF & C. SHERIF, AN OUTLINE OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 554-55 (rev. ed. 1956). 
141. See M. SHAW, supra note 23, at 282-83. See also Emerson, J)evialion and Rejection: 
An Experimental Replication, 19 AM. Soc. REv. 688 (1954) (testing theory that conformity is 
related to cohesiveness). 
142. See M. SHAW, supra note 23, at 285-86. In the more successful groups, there is a 
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These experiments, however, may overstate the effect of con-
formity. Asch's classic experiment was the basis for all later con-
formity research. Asch presented subjects with the unanimous (but 
false) judgment of the experimenter's confederates. When one con-
federate answered correctly or merely stated that he was unable to 
make a judgment, conformity decreased from thirty-three percent to 
less than six percent. 143 And, Asch's experimentaJ conditions do not 
represent the context in which peer groups make decisions. Asch did 
not permit any interaction or discussion among the members.144 In 
group discussions, each individual can account for the various posi-
tions taken by the other members and can anticipate a satisfactory 
interpretation of his or her potential dissent by the others. In Asch's 
experiment, "the assault on the [subject's] judgment reaches an in-
tensity virtually unparalleled outside the laboratory."145 The subject 
could neither account for why everybody else was wrong, nor expect 
the others to interpret his or her potential dissent satisfactorily. 
Most studies of conformity have been designed to explore the nega-
tive consequences of conformity - the loss of individuality, the re-
striction of creativity and the reduction of the group to the level of 
mediocrity. 146 In Victims of Groupthink, Janis emphasized these neg-
ative aspects in his dissection of the Bay of Pigs decision by President 
Kennedy and his advisors. Most of the pioneers who shaped this 
negative cast conducted their experiments during the height of the 
McCarthy era. Current empirical studies do not support the exist-
ence of blind adherence to the majority only for the sake of agree-
ment. In the most recent summary, Shaw stated: 
[U]ndesirable consequences undoubtedly would follow from a blind, 
unreasoning "follow the crowd" type of conformity. Fortunately, there 
is no evidence that behaving in accordance with group norms necessar-
ily, or even usually, results from such unthinking compliance. In 
many, perhaps most, instances, there are good and sufficient reasons 
for conforming to group norms. 147 
2. The Group's Dynamics 
The more significant problem in group decision-making is the 
tendency toward increased conformity. See Kidd & Campbell, Conformity to Groups as a 
Function of Group Success, 51 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCH. 390 (1955). 
143. See M. SHAW, supra note 23, at 284. 
144. See A. HARE, supra note 83, at 23-24. 
145. Ross, Bierbrauer & Hoffman, The Role of Attribution Processes in Conformity and Dis-
sent: Revisiting the Asch Situation, 31 AM. PSYCH. 148, 150 (1976). 
146. M. SHAW, supra note 23, at 289. 
147. Id (emphasis in original). 
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pressure toward convergence of opinion, not unthinking conformity, 
that occurs at some point during the decision-making process. A 
large body of the recent group research indicates that groups tend to 
become "solution-minded"; their goals of efficiency, success, and sat-
isfaction speed up the decision-making process. The danger is that 
the group will reach a unanimous, but incorrect, decision very early 
in the process.148 
Contrary to folklore, the researchers find that the real difficulty is 
in trying to slow groups down rather than trying to speed them up. 
They use various terms to describe the dynamics of making the deci-
sion very shortly after the majority opinion begins to appear - "the 
emerging consensus," "majority congruence," "group convergence," 
and "passing the adoption threshold." 149 In essence, members of the 
group initially attack the problem in an open-minded and searching 
manner, but when they sense which way the wind is blowing, they 
proceed quickly to a decision. 
Hoffman concluded that the first solution to pass what he calls 
the "adoption threshold" wins and prevents others from emerging. 1so 
At some point, the emergence of a majority becomes apparent to all, 
and dissent turns to ambiguity and then to unity, with little or no 
dissent. Group discussion and analysis serve continuously to anchor 
the developing consensus. Bales, Bormann, and Fisher have each 
confirmed the existence of this phenomenon.1s1 Coupled with the 
148. See Bamlund, supra note 32, at 59. 
149. See, e.g., I. JANIS, supra note ll I, at 11, 198-206, 218-19 (strong concurrence-seeking 
tendency); A. KOWITZ & T. KNUDSON, DECISION MAKING IN SMALL GROUPS 171-72 (1980) 
(premature consensus); Hoffman, Friend & Bond, Problem JJ!lferences and the Process of 
Adopting Group Solutions, in THE GROUP PROBLEM SOLVING PROCESS 48, 64-65 (1979) (pass-
ing the adoption threshold). 
150. ~ee Hoffman, Friend & Bond, supra note 149, at 64-65. See generally Hoffman, Appli-
cations lo the Functioning of Problem-Solving Groups, in THE GROUP PROBLEM SOL VINO PRO· 
cESs 184-87 (1979). "[T]he adoption of [the ultimate] solution could be predicted at a 
relatively early stage of the problem-solving discussion." Hoffman & Maier, Valence i11 the 
Adoption of Solutions by Prob/em-Solving Groups: IL Quality and Acceptance as Goals of 
Leaders and Members, in THE GROUP PROBLEM SOLVING PROCESS 33, 33 (1979). 
151. See E. BORMANN, DISCUSSION AND GROUP METHODS 282-83 (2d ed. 1975) (groups 
do not proceed rationally in problem solving except to justify solution); Bales, Jn Co,!fere11ce, 
HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1954, at 44; 49 (recommends reversing the order of formal parlia-
mentary procedure for group problem solving by having the group deal in the following order 
with: (I) what are pertinent facts? (2) how do group members feel about such facts? (3) what 
shall be done in reference to problem?). Fisher, Decision Emergence: Phases in Group JJeci-
sion-Making, 37 SPEECH MoN. 53, 58-65 (1970) (discusses four stages of group decision-mak-
ing). Some of the studies have literally dissected, minute by minute, the group decision-mak-
ing process. For example, one study found that 22% of the time devoted to a problem involved 
the initiation and development of one idea, 25% to the clarification of that idea and 25% to 
confirmation of the idea; in other words, 72% of the group effort was aimed at anchoring the 
first solution as the group solution. Larson, Speech Communication Research on Small Groups, 
20 SPEECH TEACHER 89, 99 (1971). Another study found that the group attention span per 
substantive ''theme" is only 76 seconds. Berg, A Descriptive Analysis of the JJistribution and 
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group's disposition to finish the task - its "solution-mindedness" -
convergence or congruence may lead to decisions based on inade-
quate information and an inadequate search for alternatives. 
Groups adopt only as many criteria as are needed to solve the prob-
lem, 152 and the group's discussion centers around the first apparently 
reasonable solution. If enough cues reveal that a solution is accept-
able, it becomes the group decision. 
In their experiments with the NASA Moon Survival Problem, 153 
Hall and Watson and Nemiroff found that the use of "intervention 
techniques" to slow down "majority congruence" led to higher qual-
ity decision-making in certain groups than in groups in which the 
usual group dynamics were at work. Hall and Watson, for example, 
instructed certain groups of businesspersons to avoid taking an early 
majority vote, to encourage differences of opinion, and to seek to 
reach a "consensus." These "instructed" groups performed signifi-
cantly better than the most proficient member of their group and 
significantly better than the uninstructed groups. These studies 
demonstrate that procedures aimed at slowing down the group dy-
namics and protecting the minority significantly improve the quality 
of group decision-making. 
3. Techniques for Slowing .Down the Group's .Dynamics 
Experimenters have used many techniques to avoid the group's 
rush to decision and to lessen conformity pressures. 154 Four tech-
niques have received empirical support: (1) anonymous voting at 
various stages of the decision process; (2) formalizing the role of 
devil's advocate, and rotating the job at each meeting; (3) using a 
"discussion leader" whose position on the issue is not known to the 
group, instead of using a high-profile leader whose position is or 
quickly becomes known to all; and (4) if the decision can wait, im-
plementing a "second round review." 
Duration of Themes Discussed by Task-Oriented, Small Groups, 34 SPEECH MoN. 172, 174 
(1967). 
152. See Hoffman, Bond & Falk, Valence far Criteria: A Preliminary Exploration, in THE 
GROUP PROBLEM SOLVING PROCESS (1979). 
153. See notes 35-36 supra. 
154. "Brainstorming" became a much used technique in the 1960's, thanks to its active 
promotion by advertiser Osborn. Rules designed to facilitate creativity are imposed on the 
group. Individuals are not allowed to criticize ideas suggested by other, but can only J?uild 
upon them or suggest other ideas. The experimental results have been equivocal. However, at 
least some of the apparent superiority of brainstorming groups may have.resulted merely from 
the use of a decision-deferral technique, or from the superiority of participants. See A. HARE, 
supra note 83, at 319; Parnes, Effects of E_xtended Ejfort in Creative Problem Solving, 52 J. 
EDUC. PSYCH. 117 (1961). 
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a. Anonymous voting by directors. Behavioral scientists have 
tested empirically various forms of anonymous voting and have 
found that such voting leads to higher quality group decisions than 
disclosed voting. Anonymous voting obviously reduces conformity 
pressures. And the various anonymous voting procedures structure 
group decision-making, and thus counteract the rush to decide, al-
though other structured or staged processes might also produce that 
effect. 
One structured process for anonymous voting - called the Nom-
inal Group Technique - was devised by Van de Ven and 
Delbecq.155 A complex problem is posed to the group. Each indi-
vidual is then given time to formulate an approach and possible so-
lution without communicating it to the others. Then a structured 
round-robin presentation by each member is made, one idea at a 
time. Each idea is immediately summarized on a blackboard. The 
group discusses the listed ideas to clarify and to evaluate them. This 
proceeds for one or more rounds. Finally, members vote by secret 
ballot and the majority decision becomes binding. 
A computer age technique called the "Delphi Process," pio-
neered by Dalkey and Hammer, is the ultimate technique for pre-
serving anonymity.156 However, the new board cannot use it in its 
stark form because the individuals comprising the "group" never 
meet face-to-face. A very complex problem is posed. Members 
communicate anonymously, either in writing or by computer. After 
each member's first input is recorded and available to all, members 
make second inputs, anonymously communicating questions and ex-
planations in the process. This procedure continues until the group 
reaches a consensus or a predetermined number of rounds have 
occurred. 
The researchers have tested these and other structured decision 
procedures with anonymous voting. Although differing on various 
155. See Van de Ven & Dell?ecq, 'fhe Effectiveness oj Nominal .Delphi and Interacting 
Group .Decision Making Processes, 17 AcAD. MGT. J. 605 (1974). For other similar studies, see 
Felsenthal & Fuchs, supra note 34; Green, An Empirical Analysis oj Nominal and Interacting 
Groups, 18 AcAD. MGT. J. 63 (1975) (contradicts Van de Ven and Delbecq on superiority of 
nominal over interacting groups); Stumpf, Freedman & Zand, Judgmental .Decisions: A Study 
oj Interactions Among Group Membership, Group Functioning, and the .Decision Situation, 22 
AcAD. MoT. J. 765, 779-80 (1979) (summarizes the conflicting evidence, and suggests, on the 
basis of a later experiment reported in the article, that when "the decision requires quality and 
originality, interacting groups are likely to recommend less effective decisions" than nominal 
groups); Stumpf, Zand & Freedman, .Designing Groups far Judgmental .Decisions, 4 AcAD, 
MoT. REv. 589 (1979). 
156. Dalkey & Hammer, An Experimental Application oj the .Delphi Method to the Use oj 
Experts, 9 MGT. SCI. 458 (1963). See Felsenthal & Fuchs, supra note 34; Reed, On the .Dynam-
ics ojGroup .Decision-making in High Places, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Winter 1978, at 49. 
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other points, they have concluded that the anonymity aspect of the 
various techniques leads to higher-quality group decisions. 
The courts, therefore, should allow the new board to experiment 
with secret voting. Present liability rules applicable to the individual 
directors may leave some room for anonymous voting, at least for all 
"votes" prior to the "official" final decision that is duly recorded in 
the minutes. Indeed, current law might permit experimentation with 
anonymous voting on the fo_rmal final decision. The anonymous dis-
senting directors later faced with a lawsuit based on the majority's 
actions might well object to such a procedure. But it is not even 
clear today whether a formal dissenting vote, without resignation or 
steps taken to prevent damage from the majority decision, will insu-
late a dissenter from liability.157 In any event, such stark situations 
are rare in the boardroom, and the uniform use of the secret ballot 
by the new board appears, on balance, worthy of' serious 
consideration. 158 
b. The chief executive as chairperson? Another approach that 
the researchers have empirically confirmed as effective in upgrading 
the quality of group decisions is the "discussion leader'' technique)59 
One person, designated the discussion leader, cannot express his-or 
her own views, but must stimulate participation by all, encourage 
questions, and protect any emerging minority. Janis and Marrn 
strongly recommend the technique, stating that it allows the group 
"the opportunity to develop an atmosphere of open inquiry and ,to 
157. Fletcher states: ''To protest is not alone sufficient to excuse a director. Ifhe does no 
more than protest he is liable as much as ifhe had acquiesced in the transaction. But protests 
followed by affirmative action will suffice." 3A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF 
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS§ 1058 (1975) (footnotes omitted). See DePinto v. Provident Security 
Life Ins. Co., 374 F.2d 37, 44 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 822 (1967) (director who resigned 
just before corporation was looted held liable for negligence; had he learned of the fraudulent 
looting plan in time (as he should have), then "armed with such information, it would have 
been [the director's] duty to decline [the] request that he resign as a director. Continuing as a 
director ... would have enabled [him] actively to oppose the proposal before the board and, if 
necessary, draw the matter to the attention of stockholders . . . and . . . of state regulatory 
officials."); Joyce, .Director of Corporations, DIRECTORS & BOARDS ;; 1, Summer 1979, at 53-54. 
Cf. Heit v. Bixby, 276 F. Supp. 217 (E.D. Mo. 1967) (lack of protest by a director made him 
liable as collaborator with other directors); Walker v. Man, 142 Misc. 277, 281-82, 253 N.Y.S. 
458, 465 (Sup. Ct. 193 I) (failure by director to protest or correct an illegal transaction 
equivalent to acquiesence for liability purposes). 
158. One company that makes it easier for directors to ask questions is Massachusetts Mu-
tual Life Insurance Company. There the directors put questions in writing anonymously prior 
to the meeting. See Scheibla, Heat on .Directors: A Revolution is Occurring in the Boardroom, 
BARRON'S, July 30, 1979, at 4, 27. 
159. See Maier & Solem, The Contribution of a .Discussion Leader to the Quality of Group 
Thinlcing: The Effective Use of Minority Opinions, 5 HUMAN REL. 277 (1952). 
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explore impartially a wide range of policy alternatives."160 An an-
nouncement of the leader's position colors the decisions of both the 
group and the leader. After persons have publicly committed them-
selves to a choice, they are likely to evaluate contrary communica-
tions in a biased manner.161 
This empirical evidence suggests that the chief executive, who 
usually places items on the board's agenda and is committed to a 
specific course of action, should not also serve as chairperson of the 
board. Acting solely as a director, the chief executive can expect the 
board to give due weight to his views in any event. However, only 
seven percent of the very largest companies and twenty-five percent 
of 1,300 large companies have seen fit to separate the roles of chief 
executive and chairperson.162 
c. Directors as rotating devil's advocates. The new board should 
also consider formalizing the position of devil's advocate.163 Janis164 
strongly recommends assigning the role of devil's advocate to mem-
bers of the group on a rotating basis.165 As envisioned by Janis, the 
group leader will have to give each member "an unambiguous as-
signment to present his arguments as cleverly and convincingly as he 
can, like a good lawyer, challenging the testimony of those advocat-
ing the majority position."166 A recent empirical study indicated 
that the devil's advocate technique slows convergence by the major-
ity and may generate more alternative solutions. 167 
Directors may be loath to adopt or implement enthusiastically 
the devil's advocate procedure because it exposes them to greater 
risks of liability: if a directorial decision is later challenged in court, 
information developed by the devil's advocate would become the 
plaintiff's starting point. But strengthening the business judgment 
160. I. JANIS & L. MANN, DECISION MAKING 399 (1977) (quoting I. JANIS, supra note 111, 
at 211). 
161. See id at 182. 
162. See KORN/FERRY 1980, supra note 6, at 3. 
163. See I. JANIS,supra note 111, at 218-19; I. JANIS & L. MANN,supra note 160, at 397-98; 
J. STEINBRUNER, supra note 43, at 338-39. Both Janis and Steinbruner have made detailed 
historical studies of high-level governmental decision-making. 
164. See I. JANIS, supra note 11 I, at 218-19; J. STEINBRUNER, supra note 43, at 338-39, also 
mentions the technique. 
165. See I. JANIS, supra note 111, at 216. Janis and Mann note that the board must pro-
vide the rotating devil's advocate with sufficient resources and staff in advance of the meeting 
in order to perform this role effectively. See I. JANIS & L. MANN, supra note 160, at 398. 
166. I. JANIS, supra note 111, at 215. 
161. See Herbert & Estes, Improving Exectftive IJecisions by Formalizing IJissent: The Cor-
porate IJevil's Advocate, 2 AcAD. MGT. REv. 662, 666 (1977). 
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defense for independent directors, as this Article recommends, 
should at least partially allay such fears. 
d. The second-round review. When time permits, the board can 
postpone a decision until its next meeting. Alfred Sloan did just 
that, and Janis recommends the procedure.168 Postponement is an 
intuitively sound way to reduce pressures toward conformity and the 
rush to decide, and the procedure has also received some empirical 
confirmation.169 Although the group literature suggests many other 
techniques for slowing down the decision-making process,170 this 
writer has not found empirical support for them. 
4. The Courts Should Encourage the Use of "Stop-and-Think" 
Procedures by the Board 
Although we know very little about the decision-making 
processes used by the typical board of a large corporation, there is 
little reason to suppose that a group of directors is exempt from the 
conformity pressures found in the many groups observed in the labo-
ratory and in the field by behavioral scientists. Because businessper-
sons typically attempt to get jobs done as quickly and efficiently as 
possible, there is also no reason to suppose that the new board is any 
less solution-minded than other groups. 171 Finally, there is little rea-
son to expect that the new board - a group composed of very busy 
individuals, highly-compensated for their other main activities ·-
will readily adopt time consuming procedures aimed at reducing the 
pressures toward conformity and quick decisions at board meetings. 
Consequently, the courts should provide positive legal incentives to 
encourage the new board to adopt one or more of the empirically 
confirmed "stop-and-think" procedures. 
Corporate law strongly emphasizes the board's decison-making 
process. After reviewing the Delaware decisions, for example, Arsht 
concluded: 
The business judgment rule was not conceived as a defense that, once 
asserted, precluded judicial inquiry into the procedures and methodol-
ogies followed by the directors in making their challenged decision . 
. . . [I]n each case the business judgment rule [expressed by the court] 
was a starting point for inquiry into the ~ectors' decisionmaking 
168. See I. JANIS, supra note lll, at 218-19. 
169. See B. BASS, ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 388-92 (1965). 
170. See notes 167-68 supra. See generally I. JANIS & L. MANN, supra note 160; A. 
KOWITZ & T. KNUDSON, supra note 149; M. SHAW, supra note 23. 
171. R. MUELLER, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR DIRECTORS 11 (1978). 
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process. 172 
At least two "process-of-decision" provisos limit the use of the busi-
ness judgment rule as a shield to judicial inquiry on the merits of a 
business decision. At the most mundane level, a director ordinarily 
must attend the meeting to share information and ideas necessary to 
render a decision. An early Delaware case_ is illustrative: "If not 
present in person to give out, or receive, business knowledge needed 
in conducting the affairs of the company . . . [the director] has not 
performed his duty, because he has not in fact participated in the 
deliberations of the board."173 The directors must also have ade-
quate information to exercise business judgment. As Judge Hand 
observed in Dames, directors have a "duty to keep themselves in-
formed in some detail, and it is this duty which the defendant in my 
judgment failed adequately to perform."174 The courts have given a 
mixed reception to this informational prerequisite to the exercise of 
business judgment, but it appears to be backed by the weight of the 
authority. It is supported by decisions in the leading corporate states 
of Delaware and New York, and by statute in California. 175 A New 
York court put this process point well: "When courts say that they 
will not interfere in matters of business judgment, it is presupposed 
that judgment - reasonable diligence - has in fact been 
exercised."176 
172. Arsht, supra note 54, at 100. 
173. Lippman v. Kehoe Stenograph Co., 11 Del. Ch. 80, 89, 95 A. 895, 899 (1915). See also 
Stevens v. Acadia Dairies, 15 Del. Ch. 248, 135 A. 846 (1927) (directors cannot act by proxy). 
Decisions requiring that notices of special meetings be sent to directors and that the notice set 
forth the precise agenda can be viewed as first-step process rules for decision-making. See W. 
CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 94, at 165-66, for collected cases and statutes. Statutes 
permit participation by telephone when "all persons participating in the meeting can hear each 
other .... " DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 14l(i) (1974). However, if the directors unanimously 
consent in writing to a decision, they need not meet to discuss the action. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
8, § 14l(f) (1974). 
174. Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614,615 (2d Cir. 1924). However, the defendant was held 
not liable because the plaintiff did not prove that the defendant's failure to become informed 
caused the damage. 
"This duty of attention is becoming increasingly important as additional emphasis is 
placed on the director's monitoring role." STAFF REPORT, supra note 16, at 663 (footnote 
omitted). 
175. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 16, at 663-64. The California statute requires that a 
director carry out his or her duties ''with such care, including reasonable inquiry, as an ordina-
rily prudent person in a like position would under similar circumstances." CAL. CORP. CODE 
§ 309(a) (West 1977). In Royal Indus., Inc. v. Monogram Indus., Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer 
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 95,863 (C.D. Cal. 1976), Royal sought to buy Sar, a com-
petitor of Monogram, so as to ward off Monogram's tender offer for Royal. The court en-
joined the purchase of Sar, noting, among other factors, that the transaction was created in 
extreme haste and without reasonable investigation by Royal. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] 
FED. SEC. L. REP. at 91, 139-40. 
176. Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625, 643 (Sup. Ct. 1944). In Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 
284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971), the court said: "Application of the [business judgment] rule 
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Under some recent decisions it is unclear whether proof that the 
directors were present and informed ends the inquiry or whether 
there is still another process-of-decision proviso to the business judg-
ment rule - that the board actually deliberated before reaching its 
business decision. Certain decisions in Delaware seem to support 
the latter process inquiry. In Lutz v. Boas,177 the Delaware Chan-
cery Court held the directors were liable because they had "made no 
efforts to be informed"178 and "gave almost automatic approval"179 
to certain agreements. 
In a more recent case, Gimbel v. Signal Co. , 180 the Delaware 
Chancery Court preliminarily enjoined Signal's sale of a subsidiary 
for an apparently grossly inadequate price. A board meeting to dis-
cuss the sale was called on very short notice, and the outside direc-
tors were not notified of the meeting's purposes. The court reviewed 
a handwritten memorandum and handwritten minutes to evaluate 
the decision-making process. After two hours of discussion, the di-
rectors approved a $480,000,000 transaction. The court noted that 
"the meeting was short for a transaction of this size .... " 181 It 
discussed a number of factors suggesting imprudence, including 
management's failure to give the board adequate advance notice of 
its prolonged negotiations, the board's failure seriously to consider 
certain views on the legality of the sale, the failure to delay the sale 
to provide adequate time for board consideration or to obtain an 
updated evaluation, the failure to consider how the corporation 
... depends upon a showing that informed directors did, in fact, make a business judgment 
authorizing the transaction under review." 
The federal courts under the federal securities laws, particularly § 11 of the Securities Act 
of 1933 and under the proxy rules under§ 14(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 
have also imposed substantial "due diligence" duties upon directors. In Gould v. American 
Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853 (D. Del. 1972), vacatedonotltergrounds, 535 F.2d 761 (3d 
Cir. 1976), the Third Circuit held outside directors liable for negligence in failing to review 
carefully a proxy statement sent to shareholders. The court said: "When possible, the . . . 
[statute] should be interpreted to afford incentives to directors to undertake active and rigorous 
scrutiny of corporate activities ...• " 351 F. Supp. at 859. The federal cases are concerned 
with the procedures used by the directors in seeking out and evaluating information for public 
disclosure under federal law. The Investment Company Act of 1940 requires that at least 40% 
of a mutual fund board consist of independent directors. In a number of cases under that Act, 
the courts have required that the board engage in ''meaningful" inquiry and decision-making. 
See Cambridge Fund, Inc. v. Abella, 501 F. Supp. 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), and cases collected 
therein. In Cambridge Fund, the Court found that the proposed indemnification of an inter-
ested party was presented to the board "in such a one-sided and incomplete manner that it 
discouraged any meaningful evaluation by the unaffiliated directors." 
177. 39 Del. Ch. 585, 171 A.2d 381 (Ch. 1961). 
178. 39 Del. Ch. at 609, 171 A.2d at 396. 
179. 39 Del. Ch. at 609, 171 A.2d at 395. 
180. 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch.), ajfd on other grounds, 316 A.2d 619 (1974). 
181. 316.A.2d at 613. , 
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would use the sale proceeds, and the indication in the "limited rec-
ord [of] a gross disparity between the fair market value" of the sub-
sidiary and the sale price. 182 Although the court said that "the 
ultimate question is not one of method but one of value,"183 the case 
serves as a possible precedent for examination of the board's deci-
sion-making process. 
Judicial inquiry into the processes of board decision-making has 
also gone beyond the "directors must be informed" condition in the 
recent take-over cases that have granted the business judgment de-
fense to the target corporation's board. This type of in-depth inquiry 
into processes may be peculiar to the take-over area because the sub-
stantive rules all touch upon the subjective motivations of the target 
board (e.g., whether the "sole," "principal," or "primary" motive of 
the board was the improper one of seeking to perpetuate its control 
for its own sake).184 But the courts might extend the process inquiry 
to other types of business decisions, under the "bad faith" exception 
to the business judgment rule. As the Second Circuit recently stated, 
"directors are presumed to have acted properly and in good faith, 
and are called to account for their actions only when they are shown 
to have engaged in self-dealing or fraud, or to have acted in bad 
faith." 185 Plaintiffs could argue that failure to deliberate or merely 
rubber stamping the recommendations of the chief executive is bad 
faith . 
. · In any event, the process of decision figured prominently in the 
lengthy facts recited and the reasoning of the courts in recent take-
over cases. In Treadway Cos. v. Care Corporation, 186 Care sought to 
acquire Treadway. Treadway successfully warded off Care, the un-
wanted suitor, by merging with a ''white knight" of Treadway's own 
choosing, Fair Lanes. At the conclusion of its lengthy opinion grant-
ing the business judgment defense to the Treadway board (except for 
Lieblich, Treadway's President), the Second Circuit observed: 
[T]here was evidence that the directors did in fact exercise their in-
dependent judgment. . . . 
The record as to what steps the Treadway directors took, and ex-
actly what iµformation they sought, preparatory to the exercise of their 
182. 316.A.2d at 614-15. 
183. 316 A.2d at 615. 
184. See, e.g., Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1980). 
185. Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357,382 (2d Cir. 1980). Plaintiffs would have 
a potential opening wedge in all cases: They need depositions of directors regarding the deci-
sion process to make the good or bad faith determination. Failing to deliberate or merely 
rubber-stamping the chief executive, they could assert, is bad faith. 
186. 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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judgment is somewhat sparse. Care would have us believe they did 
nothing. A close reading of the record, however, reveals tp.at they had 
engaged an investment banking firm [Swordco] to negotiate and help 
them evaluate proposed mergers; that between meetings of the Tread-
way board they . . . were informed of negotiations with Fair Lanes; 
that during the negotiations they sent Swordco to Fair Lanes armed 
with a number of questions to which they wished answers; that they 
asked Swordco for pro forma balance sheets for the combined com-
pany; that they adjourned their deliberations for one week thereafter to 
reflect on the information they had received and to obtain more; and 
that they conditioned their approval of the proposed transactions on 
obtaining an opinion from Swordco that the transactions were fair to 
Treadway. 
Thus the record provides no adequate basis for finding that Care 
carried its burden of proving that the directors did not exercise their 
judgment in good faith or that any other circumstances make the busi-
ness judgment rule inapposite. 187 
Treadway seems to have equated "good faith" with keeping an open 
mind, seeking outside advice when critical to a decision, and ad-
journing for a second-round review when time permits. 
In Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 188 Crouse-Hinds had ne-
gotiated a merger with Belden Corporation before the unwanted 
suitor, InterNorth, came upon the scene. Crouse-Hinds stoutly re-
sisted the new suitor and merged with Belden. The Second Circuit 
granted the business judgment defense to the Crouse-Hinds board. 
The court detailed the decision-making process just before and at the 
critical meeting of the Crouse-Hinds board, when the board decided 
to resist InterNorth's tender offer and to reaffirm its prior decision to 
merge with Belden. The court emphasized that the Crouse-Hinds 
board was "advised not to formulate conclusions," had consulted 
"its expert advisers," and relied "in part" on the opinion of its 
financial adviser in its decision. The court held that plaintiff had 
failed to rebut the presumption under the business judgment rule 
that the board had acted properly and in good faith. 189 
In Panter v. Marshall Field & Co. ,190 the Seventh Circuit recently 
187. 638 F.2d at 384 (footnotes omitted). In a footnote to the above, the Court said: 
Care has also argued, and persuaded the district court, that bad faith should be inferred 
from the haste with which the Treadway-Fair Lanes negotiations proceeded, and from the 
very terms agreed to, which Care asserts grossly disadvantaged Treadway. We see noth-
ing in the course of the board's deliberations, nor in the agreements themselves, that 
would permit the drawing of such an inference with regard to the directors other than 
Lieblich. 
638 F.2d at 384 n.53. 
188. 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980). See text at notes 67-69 supra. 
189. 634 F.2d at 702. 
190. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981). See text at notes 66-68 supra. 
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protected the target board of Marshall Field from liability to its own 
stockholders for successfully opposing takeover efforts by Carter 
Hawley Hale, the national retail chain. The court had to summarize 
the decisional process rather superficially because it affirmed the 
lower court's directed verdict for the director defendants at the close 
of the plaintifrs case. It tersely indicated that the "presumption of 
good faith the business judgment rule affords is heightened when the 
majority of the board consists of independent outside directors." 191 
The court stated: "[b]ecause our examination of the board's conduct 
does not reveal . . . bad faith, we do not believe an evaluation of the 
fairness or wisdom of the board's conduct is called for as long as it 
can be attributed to any rational business purpose."192 Although its 
opinion is unclear, the court seemed to be referring to the process of 
decision, in which the board consulted with counsel and investment 
bankers. 193 
The board's consultation with outside experts before making a 
decision has been held a factor in other cases granting the business 
judgment defense to directors;194 conversely, some courts have cited 
the failure to consult experts as evidence of a failure to exercise busi-
ness judgment.195 A board's plan to "paper up" a decision previ-
ously reached by seeking an expert opinion will not always work. In 
one takeover case, the court disregarded the hastily prepared report 
of an investment banker on the ground the board had not in fact 
relied on it. 196 
These cases are consistent with an actual deliberation or "stop-
and-think" requirement in the business judgment rule, with the bur-
den of proof on the plaintiff. "Good faith" could thus become the 
rubric for imposing on the board a "stop-and-think" rule for all 
191. 646 F.2d at 294. 
192. 646 F.2d at 295 n.7. 
193. 646 F.2d at 279-80. 
194. See Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co., 411 F. Supp. 1210, 1215 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (reliance on 
investment banker's report that tender offer price was inadequate); Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. 
Ch. 494,507, 199 A.2d 548,566 (Del. 1964) (reliance on Dunn & Bradstreet report and advice 
of investment bankers); GM Sub Corp. v. Liggett Group, Inc., No. 6155 (Del. Ch. April 30, 
1980) (unreported opinion) (tender offerer sought denial of temporary restraining order to 
prevent target corporation from selling its major asset; target's consultation with investment 
bankers was cited by the Chancellor as evidence that the directors had exercised their business 
judgment in good faith); Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d 556, 568 (Del. Ch. 1977) (reliance 
upon advice of investment bankers in setting price of stock repurchased from dissident 
shareholder). 
195. See Pitt & Israel, Recent Cases Chart Use Of Business Judgment Rule, Legal Times of 
Washington, Jan. 19, 1981, at 35. 
196. Royal Indus., Inc. v. Monogram Indus., Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. 
L. REP. (CCH) ~ 95,863, at 91,135-36 (C.D. Cal. 1976). 
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business decisions. Whether the courts should apply this developing 
"process-of-decision" law to the new board is a difficult question. A 
"stop-and-think" rule would encourage independent directors to 
"lift themselves up by their own psychological bootstraps," 197 and to 
seek to avoid pressures toward conformity and quick decisions. But 
such a rule would allow plaintiffs to enter the boardroom too easily, 
fishing for substance under the guise of process. The incentives for 
independent directors to serve are fragile as it is. Given the overrid-
ing goal of encouraging truly independent directors to serve and to 
participate actively, the courts should strengthen the business judg-
ment defense applicable to such directors, not weaken it by adding 
further uncertainties to its invocation. 
The courts can create an incentive for the adoption of "stop-and-
think" procedures by closing the boardroom door upon a showing by 
an independent board that (1) the chief executive is not chairperson 
of the board; or (2) the board .uses the devil's advocate technique; or 
(3) voting at various stages of the decision-making process is anony-
mous; or ( 4) the board made the particular decision at a "second 
round" review. 198 Other techniques could be added to the list as 
they receive empirical support. And, if the new board sought outside 
advice prior to making the particular decision, a court could fore-
close further inquiry into the process of decision, as in Panter. Such 
consultation makes the independent directors stop and think as 
much as the confirmed techniques. It has especial application in the 
takeover cases, where target boards uniformly consult outside coun-
sel and investment bankers despite the pressures for a quick and uni-
form response by the directors. 199 
Even this somewhat superficial process-of-decision rule would 
flush out evidence as to whether the board has any "stop-and-think" 
procedure whatsoever. But once the new board has come forward 
with such evidence, the court will have to close the boardroo~ door; 
otherwise the plaintiff will try to fish for substance while challenging 
the bona jides of the process.200 
197. R. MUELLER, mpra note 171, at 11. 
198. The "simple" showing would involve testimony by an independent director that the 
new board regularly uses one of the procedures and in fact used it in the process of making the 
challenged business decision. The second round review is an exception to the suggestion of 
proof of regular use. 
199. A recent SEC rule requires the board to respond to a tender offer within ten business 
days after it is made. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (1980). 
200. The proposed rule is "superficial" in the sense that the new board can merely "go 
through the motions" at meetings simply to get the benefits proposed. The devil's advocate, 
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IV. THE NEW BOARD AS BUSINESS-DECIDER 
This section of the Article uses the empirical findings already dis-
cussed and other recent literature on decision-making to sketch a 
tentative framework for allocating decision-making between the new 
board and the chief executive in the large corporation. The evidence 
indicates that, all things being equal, peer group decisions will quali-
tatively surpass those made by individuals. On this basis, this Article 
has argued that the law should protect as strongly as possible the 
decisions of that important and new peer group in the very large 
corporation - the board composed of a majority of independent di-
rectors. A nearly absolute business judgment defense for the new 
board would not only encourage the board to make important deci-
sions; it would also provide incentives for truly independent direc-
for example, could regularly be a sheep in wolfs clothing by implicit agreement among group 
members. 
Any process rule is subject to manipulation, particularly by persons who face potential 
liability. If courts require board meetings to be tape recorded, would the directors wink or use 
hand signals? If they require board meetings to be videotaped, would the directors informally 
meet and thereafter conduct the formal meeting as television actors would? Many legal rules 
are imposed despite the high potential for evasion, because most people will comply with 
them. Further, the affected persons include businesspersons, government officials, and aca-
demics. Most are honest and responsible individuals, who will refuse to evade a procedure 
which both the law has embraced and the members have decided is best designed to reduce the 
very pressures of which they are aware. Further, once an ongoing group develops a procedure 
it rarely deviates from it. For example, if the board selected the rotating devil's advocate 
procedure it would slowly but surely incorporate the role as part of its "culture" or "norms." 
Each member would experience the role, and the group itself would be exposed to it meeting 
after meeting. 
A more direct approach might be ''to activate the board of directors" to adopt one of the 
techniques by mandating disclosure, under the federal proxy rules, of the decisional proce-
dures used by the board. This idea derives from several unrelated proposals of Professors 
Elliot J. Weiss and Donald E. Schwartz. Weiss & Schwartz, Using JJisc/osure lo Activate the 
Board of JJirectors, LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Summer 1977, at 63; Weiss & Schwartz, .Disclo-
sure Approach far JJirectors, HARV. Bus. REv., Jan.-Feb. 1978, at 18; Weiss & Schwartz, Using 
JJisc/osure lo Activate the Board of .Directors, in CORPORATIONS AT THE CROSSROADS: Gov-
ERNANCE AND REFORM 109 (D. DeMott ed. 1980) (updated version of their previous articles). 
Under the proxy rules (or the reporting requirements of the 1934 Act), the SEC could require 
the board to disclose whether it utilizes one of the empirically recognized techniques or an-
other technique reasonably designed to accomplish the same purposes. However, proxy state• 
ments are cluttered as it is and costly and shareholders of large corporations may not be 
interested in this kind of information. The SEC should therefore give the new board time to 
choose decision-making procedures or decide not to impose new federal burdens on it. A 
possible alternative would be legislating process rules. Professor Christopher D. Stone has 
recently analyzed the efficacy of achieving corporate control through various types of liability 
rules. This author's suggestion that the process rules be imposed only indirectly and at the 
instance of a shareholder in a derivative suit (in Stone's phrase a "harm-based liability rule") 
may be less efficacious in inducing the adoption of such rules generally (and may be more 
costly) than the adoption of "standards," presumably through legislation. See Stone, The 
Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90 YALE L.J. I, 41 (1980) 
(submitting that monitoring and enforcement costs could be reduced by adopting 
"standards"). 
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tors to serve, and might encourage those companies that do not have 
a majority of such directors to reach at least that goal. 
The peer group superiority evidence also supports the corollary 
argument that, all other things being equal, the chief executive 
should make fewer decisions. And other recent evidence further in-
dicates that the chief executive should refer decisions to the board 
whenever practicable. This recent evidence, from the cognitive psy-
chologists, pierces the mystique of individual intuitive and cognitive 
skills and leads to somewhat pessimistic conclusions. The individ-
ual's capacities for processing information and making decisions are 
more limited and error-prone than had previously be~n supposed. 
The same research also indicates that all individuals - especially 
the chief executive -have "cognitive conceit": they are unwilling to 
recognize their natural limitations.201 As Dr. Harlan Meal, then a 
manager for the preeminent business consultant Arthur D. Little, 
has observed: "Very few executives think of themselves as gamblers 
or of making the best kind of decisions in a gambling situation. 
They want, instead, to think of themselves as individuals whose 
greater grasp of the available information and whose greater insight 
remove the uncertainty from the ~ituation."202 This widely-shared 
article of faith poses its own dangers. 
A framework for allocating decision-making in- the very large 
corporation must also take into account the work of the scholars of 
organizations and bureaucracies. Those scholars have ably demon-
strated that all things are not equal in the real world of the large 
corporation. Substantial time and informational constraints impede 
ideal decision-making by both the chief executive and the board. 
Any allocation between the_ two must recognize those types of deci-
sions that the board, as a practical matter, cannot :µiake. These orga-
nizational and pracd.cal considerations even foreclose the chief 
executive from making many. ~ajor decisions. The development of 
autonomous divisions in many. of the very large corporations, with 
each division a separate "profit center'' under the management of a 
different senior executive, has radicaUy changed the .functions of the 
chief executive. The chief executive of such a corporation now 
serves as a board of directors, advising and monitoring the divisional 
chiefs, subject to the same informational constraints. on decisions as 
201. This is the classic "double-bind." Dawes, who presents the most pessimistic version, 
coined the term "cognitive conceit": our limited cognitive capacity is such that it prevents us 
from being aware of its limited nature. See Dawes, Shallow Psychology, in COGNITION AND 
SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 3 (1976). 
202. Brown, .Do Managers Find .Decision Theory Useful?, HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 
1970, at 78, 86. 
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the board. 203 
Given the superiority of the new board over the chief executive 
in decision-making, a re-examination of the functions of each is in 
order. In the divisionalized large corporation, the new board could 
assume responsibility for decision areas in which the chief executive 
now exclusively operates, subject to the same informational con-
straints that the chief executive now confronts. But the limited 
amount of time available to independent directors and the absence 
of time constraints on the chief executive demand that the new board 
take over only a few decision-making categories. In addition to the 
traditional decisions that the law requires the board to make, such as 
mergers and stock issuances, the board should: (1) make all long-
term and strategic planning decisions; (2) fix the annual corporate 
budget and allocate funds among the various divisions or depart-
ments; (3) fix the standards of compensation for all executives; and 
(4) make those decisions placed before the chief executive that in-
volve stark or "all-or-none" choices, unless an immediate decision is 
required, and the board or an independent board committee is un-
available. This list should not, however, obscure the main point of 
the findings: All other things being equal (and the organization usu-
ally imposes equal informational constraints on both the board and 
the chief executive), the board and not the chief executive should be 
encouraged to make business decisions. 
The first three items are part of emerging trends, and their inclu-
sion is neither radical nor new. A recent survey of Fortune 500 di-
rectors pointed to annual plans and budgets for the corporation and 
long-range corporate plans as some of the new board's most impor-
tant information needs.204 Establishing compensation standards has 
been the principal work of the independent compensation committee 
for quite a while.205 The fourth item, involving stark choices, may 
203. A Wall Street Journal article about Thomas A. Murphy, the recently retired chairman 
and chief executive of General Motors, stated: 
Mr. Murphy suggests that the power of the chairman of GM is in part illusory, that 
GM's management system almost dictates important decisions be made before they arrive 
for formal approval at the top, and that the company is nearly as self-governing as a 
Cadillac on cruise control. 
. . . . Mr. Murphy jokes that the main decisions he makes are ''what time to get up 
and whether to go to church." He says that all subjects at scheduled meetings are care-
fully worked over by staffers and scrutinized by committees beforehand. By the time he 
sees the material, he says, "the data suggest the decision" and he often just concurs. 
Top Men al General Motors Look al Their Jobs, Wall St. J., Sept. 16, 1980, at 33, col. 3. 
204. See Shanklin & Ryans, supra note 19, 24. Another recent survey of directors found 
that most directors already think that long-range planning for the company is an important 
part of their job. See THE NEW DIRECTOR, supra note 12, at 20, 21, 29, 32. 
205. See note 6 supra; THE NEW DIRECTOR, supra note 12, at 21. 
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well represent the types of decisions that the chief executive today 
does present to the new board, if only for sage advice from the direc-
tors on "high-stress" decisions.206 
The law can provide the incentives for the board to make more 
decisions in these four areas by strengthening the board's business 
judgment defense. With this almost absolute protection accorded to 
board decisions, the board will probably delegate fewer major deci-
sion areas to the chief executive than in the past. At the same time, 
the courts can encourage the chief executive to advise the board on a 
timely basis of the major decisions required to be made. Professor 
Weber has referred to the "fait accompli" problem. The board must 
instruct the chief executive to report on ongoing projects, not just 
accomplished projects. Otherwise the chief executive 
will tend to report to the board only those aspects of corporate activi-
ties which have reached a consensus stage, eliminating from his pro-
gress report any information in evolution or in question due to changes 
in the corporation's internal life or environment. Yet it is precisely this 
kind of information which can indicate to the director whether or not 
s/he needs to assume the decision-maker's role.207 
The courts can ensure the timely provision of this essential informa-
tion by exploiting the present ambiguity in the applicability of the 
business judgment rule to important decisions made by the chief ex-
ecutive without meaningful prior consultation with the board, or by 
directly applying agency law to the duties of the chief executive to 
the new board. 
A. .Decision-Making by Individuals 
It has long been recognized that the individual has a "bounded 
rationality,"208 and recent :findings show that the individual's cogni-
206. Psychologists have found that the best decision-making occurs with "moderate" stress 
levels. See I. JANIS & L. MANN, supra note 160, at 51; Zander & Medow, Strength of group and 
desire far attainable group aspirations, 33 J. PERSONALITY 122 (1965). 
207. Weber,Advise or .Decide: Corporate Identity Crises and the .Director's .Decision-Making 
Role, DIRECTORS & BOARDS,, Fall 1979, at 52, 53 (citation omitted). Louis W. Cabot concurs: 
"Present important issues to directors before, not after, management has taken a firm posi-
tion." Cabot, On an Effective Board, 54 HARV. Bus. R.Ev. Sept.-Oct. 1976, at 46. Professor 
A.M. Weimer polled "over forty corporate directors with long records of service" and reports: 
"Many board members believe that they are not brought into the decision-making process at 
an early enough stage. In some cases they are simply called upon to ratify the decisions that 
management has already reached or decisions that have, for practical purposes, been made by 
the executive committee." Weimer, Corporate Boards: Improving Their Job Perfonnance, 22 
Bus. HORIZONS, June 1979, at 28, 28, 31. 
208. See R. CYERT & J. MAR.CH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 10 (1963) (order in 
which environment is searched largely determines the decisions that will be made); I. JANIS & 
L. MANN, supra note 160, at 15 (vulnerability to gross errors in arriving at a decision through 
superficial search and biased information processing); J. MARCH & H. SIMON, ORGANIZA-
TIONS 138-42, 169-71 (1958) (authors describe the effect of the boundaries of rationality on 
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tive capacities are severely limited. The average individual can pro-
cess an average of five to seven information "chunks" at any one 
time in making a decision.209 And each individual has systematic 
methods for processing, storing, and retrieving information. We call 
these "points of view," or use other euphemistic terms for what is in 
essence a·severe limitation on individual capacity. 
In the business world, behavioral scientists have identified at 
least four cognitive or "mental" approaches by chief executives to 
making major corporate decisions.210 These approaches are not dif-
ferent management philosophies, but radically different ways of see-
ing the world and making decisions. They range from the purely 
intuitive chief executive to the very systematic and detail-oriented 
boss. Free market economists might urge that cognitive style, like 
other variables, enters into the efficient fit of the proper chief execu-
tive with the particular successful corporation. This may be so, but 
let us explore further. 
In addition to vastly different cognitive styles, individuals rely 
upon a limited number of intuitive principles to simplify the com-
plex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting events when mak-
ing judgments under uncertainty - the very essence of business 
decisions. When used by an able and intelligent individual, these 
principles are highly economical and usually effective, but they lead 
to systematic errors.211 These findings are but a small part of the 
recent empirical assault by behavioral scientists upon the intuitive 
organizational structu_re); J. STEINBRUNER, supra note 43, at 130-32, 136 (author describes and 
gives examples of the cognitive dimensions of political and organizational phenomena); Pfef-
fer, Power and Resource Allocation in Organizations, in PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 278, 280-83 (B. Staw ed. 1977) (man desires to be rational and is 
rational within the limits of his cognitive capabilities); Suedfield, supra note 43, at 209 (1978) 
(decision-making under high information loads tends to become stereotyped); Mayhew & Lev-
inger, On the Emergence of Oligarchy in Human Interaction, 81 AM. J. Soc. 1017, 1021 (1976) 
(humans cannot simultaneously conceptualize an array of more than five to nine significant 
events from recent experience); von Holstein, Probability Encoding in Practice, in THE ROLE 
AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THEORIES OF DECISION IN PRACTICE 148, 150 (D. White & K. Bowen 
eds. 1975) [hereinafter cited as WHITE & BOWEN]. Cf. Johnson, Co'!flict Avoidance Through 
Acceptable J)ecisions, 27 HUMAN REL. 71 (1974) (top management makes the second best deci-
sions in order to increase certainty and reduce interpersonal friction). One review of the find-
ings on the cognitive limitations of individuals states that "decision makers utilize information 
primarily to reinforce - not change - their predispositions toward the information and alter-
natives available." Robertson, supra note 125, at 168 (emphasis in original). 
209. See Mayhew & Levinger, supra note 208, at 1021-22. 
210. See McKenny & Keen, How Managers' Minds Work, HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 
1974, at 79, 80-81, 83 (identifying managers as systematic thinkers, intuitive thinkers, receptive 
thinkers, preceptive thinkers). See generally B. BASS, ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 388-90 
(1965) (differences in personality and position held cause managers to view the same problem 
in different ways). 
211. More simply put, "individuals get into ruts in their thinking." Maier, Assets and Lia-
bilities in Group Problem Solving, in READINGS IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 163 (1979). 
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and cognitive abilities of the individual. 212 
These scientists have shown, for example, that most individuals 
misinterpret highly relevant evidence in making intuitive judgments. 
Imagine an um filled with balls, of which two thirds are one color 
and one third another. X has drawn five balls from the um and 
found that four were red and one was white. Y has drawn twenty 
balls and found that twelve were red and eight were white. Which of 
the two individuals should feel more confident that the um contains 
two-thirds red and one-third white balls rather than the opposite? Y 
should feel twice as confident as X. But research findings indicate 
that most individuals select X. Many individuals intuitively feel that 
the smaller sample provides stronger evidence that the um is 
predominantly red because the proportion of red balls is larger in the 
smaller sample than in the larger one.213 
Behavioral scientists have also found that individuals are "often 
confident in predictions that are quite likely to be off the mark."214 
For example, most individuals tend to overestimate the probability 
that chain or sequentially related events will occur.215 Intuitively, 
these individuals harbor unwarranted optimism that each of a- series. 
of very likely events necessary to a successful result will occur, even 
if the number of events is large.216 The development of a new prod-
uct is an example.217 And, many individuals tend to underestimate 
the probability that nonsequential or "disjunctive" events will oc-
cur. 218 A complex system will malfunction if any of its key elements 
fails. Although the likelihood of failure of any key element is slight, 
212. See, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 
185 SCIENCE l 124 (1974). 
213. Id at 1125. 
214. Id at 1126. See Tversky & Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic far Judging Fre-
quency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCH. 207 (1973). 
215. See Bar-Hillel, 9 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR - HUMAN PERFORMANCE 396 (1973),. 
cited in Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 212, at 1128-29. 
216. See Cohen, Chesnick & Haran, 63 BRIT. J. PSYCH. 41 (1972), cited in Tversky & 
Kahneman, supra note 212, at 1129 n.10. 
217. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 212, at 1129. 
218. Id This has been confirmed in studies of choice among gambles and of judgments of 
probability. In one study, individuals had to bet on one of two events. Three types of events 
were used in mixes of two at a time: (i) drawing a red marble from a bag containing an equal 
number of red and white marbles (probability is .50); (ii) drawing a red marble seven times in 
a row from a bag containing nine times as many red as white marbles (probability is .48); or 
(iii) drawing a red marble at least once in seven tries from a bag containing nine times as many 
white as red marbles (probability is .52). After each draw, the marble was placed back in the 
bag. The subjects preferred to bet on (ii) rather than (i), and preferred to bet on (i) rather than 
(iii). Thus, most preferred to bet on the less likely event in both cases, having overestimated 
the likelihood that sequentially related events would occur (the preference of (ii) over (i)), and 
underestimated the likelihood that nonsequential events would occur (the preference of (i) 
over (iii)). Id 
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the probability of malfunction can be high if the system contains 
many elements. Although presumably aware of Murphy's law, these 
individuals intuitively underestimate the probabilities of failure of 
complex systems.219 
According to Janis and Mann, psychologists and others are 
directing more effort toward elucidating hitherto unexplored flaws and 
limitations in human information processing, such as the propensity of 
decision makers to be distracted by irrelevant aspects of the alterna-
tives, which leads to loose predictions about outcomes . . . the ten-
dency of decision makers to be swayed by the form in which 
information about risks is packaged and presented . . . their reliance 
on faulty categories and stereotypes . . . and their illusion of control, 
which makes for over-optimistic estimates of outcomes that are a mat-
ter of chance or luck .... 220 
In another recent review of the evidence, Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lich-
tenstein stated: 
[R]esearch provides dramatic support· for Simon's concept of bounded 
rationality. The experimental results indicate that people systemati-
cally violate the principles of rational decision making when judging 
probabilities, making predictions, or otherwise attempting to cope with 
probabilistic tasks. Frequently, these violations can be traced to the 
use of judgmental heuristics or simplification strategies. These heuris-
tics may be valid in some circumstances but in others they lead to bi-
ases that are large, persistent, and serious in their implications for 
decision making. 
Much evidence suggests that the laboratory results will generalize. 
Cognitive limitations appear to pervade a wide variety of tasks in 
which intelligent individuals serve as decision makers, often under 
conditions that maximize motivation and involvement.221 
Another authority recently encapsuled the evidence in dramatic 
fashion. "[O]ur cognitive capacities have obviously evolved in a less 
complex environment than we presently inhabit."222 
219. Tversky and Kahneman summarize the recent evidence as follows: 
Although the statistically sophisticated avoid elementary errors . . . their intuitive judg-
ments are liable to similar fallacies in more intricate and less transparent problems. 
. . • What is perhaps surprising is the failure of people to infer from lifelong experi-
ence • . . fundamental statistical rules . . . . 
. . . [P]eople usually do not detect the biases in their judgments of probability. 
Id at 1130. But see Einhorn & Hogarth, Behavioral Decision Theory: Processes of Judgment 
and Choice, 32 ANN. REv. PSYCH. 53 (1981) (review of the literature, noting some dissent from 
the dominant Tversky & Kahneman view; Cohen is the most prominent dissenter). 
220. I. JANIS & L. MANN, supra note 160, at 16. See A. GEORGE, PRESIDENTIAL DEC!• 
SIONMAKING IN FOREIGN POLICY 19 (1980); Langer, The Illusion of Control, 32 J. PERS. & 
Soc. PSYCH 311 (1975). 
221. Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, Cognitive Processes and Societal Risk Taking, in 
COGNITION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 165, 169, 173 (1976). 
222. Greene, Social Perception as Problem Solving, in COGNITION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 
155, 161 (1976). 
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Fortunately, the evidence to date does not prove that an individ-
ual makes the same systematic errors as most other individuals or 
that an individual repeats the same systematic errors all or most of 
the time. All that can reasonably be inferred from the evidence is 
that corporations are safer committing major business decisions to 
an intelligent peer group than to any intelligent individual. 
B. Strategic and Stark-Choice .Decisions 
There is another dimension to·be considered when allocating de-
cision-making authority between the board and the chief executive: 
Decision-making under risk and uncertainty involves a choice 
among strategies. According to various decision theories, the deci-
sion-maker assigns a value to each possible outcome of a particular 
decision and judges the corresponding probability that each outcome 
will occur. A weighted average formula composed of the values and 
probabilities223 then enables the decision-maker to decide whether to 
act or to gather further information (at further cost) that may change 
the probabilities previously assigned to each outcome. 
This :first step recognizes, albeit in a formal manner, that practi-
cal decision-making under uncertainty involves subjective judg-
ments. The next step reveals the biases or "strategies" of the 
decision-maker. A complex decision problem permits a number of 
possible values or "payoffs" for each strategy, depending on condi-
tions that the decision-maker cannot control. Analysis of strategies 
can be visualized by creating a "payoff matrix." 
Assume the simplest case - only two possible selections, heavy 
investment in plant and equipment (S1) versus no investment (S2), 
and only one condition beyond our control, the state of the general 
economy, expressed as extremes: depression (N 1) versus prosperity 
(N2). Assume N 1 and N2 are equally probable.224 The decision-
maker has estimated the payoffs, expressed as whole numbers. The 
payoff matrix looks like this: 
223. The expected value of an outcome, symbolized as E(X), is a weighted average of the 
values of the various outcomes, X 1, X2, • •• , Xi,, and is expressed by the formula: 
E(X) = P1X1 + P2X2 + .•• +PnXn 
where P represents the probability and X represents the reward or value of the outcome. P1 + 
P2 + .•. + Pn = l. Spen~r,Adminstrative Science, in MANAGEMENT OF THE URBAN CRISIS 
261, 280 (1971). 
224. This assumption simplifies the succeeding analysis. In the real world, the decision-
maker will weight the probabilities that N I and N2 will occur, and this will be reflected in the 
numbers in the succeeding matri=. 





S2 4 6 
This will unmask the strategic bias of the decision maker, which is 
rarely articulated in individual decision-making. Some urge these-
lection of S1 because it maximizes the average payoff (6) over the S2 
payoff (5).225 Others urge S2 because it assures that the worst payoff 
we can get is four if a depression occurs. 226 This is a "pessimistic" or 
"maxim.in" strategy. The decision maker seeks to maximize the min-
imum possible payoff. Still others urge S1 b~cause it minimizes "re-
gret."227 Regret is the difference between the actual payoff received 
and the payoff that would have been received had we known in ad-
vance whether depression or prosperity would occur. S1 minimizes 
our regret (-2) as contrasted with S2 (-4). 
This rather formal analysis serves merely to dramatize the sub-
jectivity involved in assessing probabilities, determining "payoff'' 
values, and making the final decision.228 Actually there is a blurred 
subjective relationship among the three seemingly separate steps. 
Decision-makers introduce an upward bias when estimating the 
probability of a highly valued outcome occurring under their pre-
ferred strategy.229 
Forcing the decision-maker to articulate these critical subjective 
matters before making a decision should lead to higher quality deci-
sions.230 The peer group setting of the boardroom will produce this 
result. But delegating major decisions to the chief executive alone or 
in consultation with subordinates may not lead to articulation of 
their strategic choices, and, in any event, such choices may be unduly 
biased toward the short-term results that determine their level of 
compensation. 
225. See P. LAPLACE, A PHILOSOPHICAL EssAY ON PROBABILITIES 20-21 (6th ed. 1951). 
226. See A. WALD, STATISTICAL DECISION FUNCTIONS 8 (1950). 
227. See L. SAVAGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS 163-64 (1954). 
228. See Comath, Prescriptive Versus IJescriptive IJecfsion Theory: Where Might the Twain 
Meet? in WHITE & BOWEN, supra note 208, at 97, 100; A. GEORGE, supra note 220, at 38-39 
('bolstering'). See generally H. RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS (1968). 
229. See A. GEORGE, supra note 220, at 38. 
230. See Brant, IJerivation of Subject Probabilities to Aid in the IJecision Processes in IJe-
fance Weapons Acquisition, in WHITE & BOWEN, supra note 208, at 162, 168. At the lower 
levels, the individual decision-maker can be forced to make the process explicit by using a 
"strawman." The strawman articulates the decision process and the decision-maker critiques 
the strawman. Id 
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Neither the formal decision matrix nor the various strategies em-
ployed in decision analysis fully capture the business decision-
maker's usual emphasis on avoiding an alternative that may lead to 
failure and the corresponding neglect of potentially good alterna-
tives.231 And the decider may not perceive strategies as independent 
of each other. In short: 
[The decision maker] is concerned with partial commitment . . . trying 
to reduce uncertainties as he goes along until he makes the final deci-
sion. . . . He would like to know what he has to pay to keep options 
open, what he has to pay to delay final commitment. . . . The deci-
sion is not so much disappearing; perhaps, as le~s definite than analysts 
make it seem.232 
Long-range and other overall corporate planning require the cor-
poration to select a strategy explicitly and knowingly. Given the im-
portance of long-range and strategic planning and the relative lack 
of time and informational constraints imposed by the organization 
itself on such decisions, the board, and not the chief executive, 
should make these decisions. The payoff matrix also emphasizes the 
desirability of peer group decision-making by the new board when 
any major decision, short- or long-term, involves stark or "all-or-
none" choices. Only time constraints will limit the board in this 
area. 
C. Corporate Projects and Budget Allocation Among the Divisions 
According to the organizational experts, strategic planning, spon-
sorship of major projects, and·the annual corporate budgeting·pro-
cess are more akin today to politics than to optimal economic 
decision-making. The various divisions or "subunits" of the corpo-
ration engage in a species of coalition bargaining with their counter-
parts before bringing proposals to their superiors. Individuals 
campaign for "pet projects,"233 and the chief executive in the large 
23 l. The avoidance of the bad alternatives is a Type I error in statistics; the relative neglect 
of potentially good alternatives is a Type II error. 
232. JJiscussion -Prescriptive and JJescripiive Choice, in WHITE & BOWEN, supra note 208, 
at 113, 114 (remarks of G.D. Kaye). 
A summary of some of the empirical evidence as to what decision-makers actually do is 
contained in Barron, An Information Processing Methodology far Inquiring into JJecision 
Processes, in WHITE & BOWEN, supra note 208, at 195. For example, individuals quite often 
make the decision with the higher probability of winning rather than the decision with the 
higher winning payoff. Id at 202. 
233. See Stagner, Corporate JJecision Making: An Empirical Study, 53 J. APPLIED PSYCH. l 
(1969). Not only do departmental heads seek to gain support for their "pet projects" but they 
also tend to perceive pro~lems from the point of view of their specific department. See Dear-
born & Simon, Selective Perception: A Note on the Departmental Identtftcations of Executives, 
21 SOCIOMETRY ·140 (1958). 
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divisionalized firm "tends to ratify strategic investment proposals de-
veloped by managers heading operating units throughout the 
fum."234 In the words of Professor Coffee, "operations make policy" 
in these firms. 235 
If the chief executive cannot modify these powerful organiza-
tional dynamics, then perhaps the board cannot do so either. But the 
independent board can at least assess these proposals from a more 
objective viewpoint, separating to some extent the personalities from 
the proposals. Two distinguished organizational scholars have 
stated that "[t]he strategic planning process would be far more eff ec-
tive if the proposed actions could be divorced from individual spon-
sorship."236 Based on the previously discussed evidence, the new 
board or an independent committee thereof could improve upon 
what "little" decision-making the chief executive makes in these 
areas. 
D. Organizational Constraints on Decision-Making at the Top 
As the previous secti~n indicated, the complex organization 
solves many problems involving uncertainty by forcing decision-
making downward to the specialists or unit closest to the scene. 
Each unit deals with the slice of the complex environment that the 
corporation has assigned to it and programs everything else out. The 
specialists "hedge" by making a decision with foreseeable short-term 
consequences. This permits fine-tuning from time to time based on 
continuous feedback. Decisions are made only when a problem 
arises, and the responses are usually highly programmed. The need 
to act quickly requires that the decision be made at the lowest practi-
cable organizational level. As experts in "the art of muddling 
through"237 and "satisficing,"238 the affected parties form a coalition 
and adopt the first solution to meet the minimum level of acceptabil-
ity. The various and changing coalitions bent on solving today's 
pressing problems subtly and slowly dilute, multiply, or postpone the 
corporation's goals, and only those decisions that vitally affect the 
entire organization, such as annual budgets, reward systems, and in-
creasing or decreasing the size of the organization, filter up to the 
234. Kinnunen, Hypotheses Related to Strategy Fonnulation in Large Divlsionalized Compa• 
nies, AcAD. MOT. R.E.v., Oct. 1976, at 7, 7. 
235. Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Miscon-
duct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1129-30 (1977). 
236. Cohen & Cyert, Strategy: Fonnulation, Implementation, and Monitoring, 46 J. Bus. 
349, 361 (1973). 
237. Seeid 
238. See note 43 supra. 
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top.239 These constraints on decision-making at the top apply 
equally to the chief executive and the board. It is only those major 
decisions that the chief executive makes or is organizationally able to 
make that can form the basis for any allocation of decision-making 
between the chief executive and the board. 
Even those matters that filter to the top for decision suffer from 
"upward information distortion." According to Professor Coffee, 
"some corporations have today between twelve and fifteen hierarchi-
cal .levels between the first-line supervisor and the company presi-
dent, suggesting that much 'noise' and only a very diluted message 
will reach the top through regular lines of communication."240 This 
obviously imposes severe informational constraints on the chief ex-
ecutive. But the chief executive should not introduce any further sig-
nificant distortion when he transmits this information to his or her 
peers on the new board in the decision areas that the board takes 
over. 
As the Business Roundtable recently observed: "Cutting across 
all these board functions is the board's responsibility to establish in 
conjunction with the chief executive officer and his operating and 
staff colleagues, systems and procedures to assure that there is a flow 
of information to the board sufficient to permit the effective dis-
charge of its obligations."241 This may be easier said than done. 
Lawler and Rhode noted that "managers who are not involved in 
setting up information and control systems often don't have the ex-
pertise to interpret them and thus all they can do is rubber stamp the 
decisions of those who have the knowledge."242 And, the board will 
have to protect itself against informational "overload," which may 
be as bad as or worse than too little information. As experienced 
businesspersons, however, most directors should be able to handle 
the "overload" problem effectively.243 
E. The Role of the Law in Allocating JJecision-Making Between the 
Chief Executive and the Board 
The legal model of the corporation traditionally required that the 
board "manage" the business, make business decisions, and hire and 
239. See id; Van de Ven, A Panel Study on the l!ffects of Task Uncertainty, Interdependence 
and Size on Unit JJecision Making, 8 ORGANIZATION & AD. SCI. 237, 239, 244 (1977). 
240. Coffee, Sllpra note 235, at 1138 (footnote omitted). 
241. Business Roundtable, The Role and Composition of the Boards of JJirectors of the 
Large Publicly-Owned Corporation, 33 Bus. LAW. 2083, 2103 (1978). 
242. E. LAWLER & J. RHODE, INFORMATION AND CONTROL IN ORGANIZATIONS 140 
(1976). 
243. See Coffee, S11pra note 235, at 1139, 1145. 
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fire the officers. Recently, the model has been modified by statute in 
many states to permit the officers ''under the direction" of the board 
to manage the corporation's business.244 The modification recog-
nizes that directors do not have the time to manage and that the chief 
executive or his subordinates make most major business decisions.245 
Under these statutes, the courts can and should require the new 
board to "direct" in a sense quite different from the "monitoring" 
model, but involving far less work than the old (and fictional) "man-
aging" model. 
Under the "monitoring" model the directors are to monitor the 
"performance" of the chief executive. If this requires only a review 
of the financial statements, and a continuous grading of the chief 
executive's intellect and ability, the director's job would be demean-
ing and unacceptable to most truly independent, highly motivated, 
and capable persons. And the cost in total compensation to those 
persons who accepted might outweigh the benefits to the corpora-
tion. The financial reports are for all to see, and this kind of corpo-
rate "performance" is closely monitored today by the stock market. 
The only difference between monitoring by the stock market and the 
independent board is that the latter can fire or discipline the chief 
executive more quickly. This difference is important - the primary 
rationale for the monitoring model. But the instances in which the 
new board considers the guillotine are relatively rare, although un-
doubtedly more frequent than when the chief executive dominated 
the board. 
The persons who would accept a "monitoring" job as so defined 
would do so for the ''wrong" reasons - pay and prestige for little or 
no work. A "one hand washes the other'' ethic would spread such 
directors on a subtle reciprocal basis across the Fortune 500 and be-
yond. Many persons undoubtedly believe that this is the reality to-
day. Of optimistic bent, this author would assert that the honest, 
conscientious, and successful people on the new board - the 
"achievers" with a strong sense of personal worth - would rather do 
something meaningful with the time they have committed to devote 
to the role. 246 
244. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 14l(a) (Supp. 1980); w. CARY & M. EISENBERO, supra 
note 94, at. 140, 193. 
245. See w. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 94, at 193. 
246. See generally R. MUELLER, supra note 171; D. McCLELLAND, supra note 60. The 
predominant reason given by prospective outside directors for declining an invitation to serve 
was "the time commitment involved." KoRN/FERRY 1981, supra note 6, at 8, 21. 
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Professor Eisenberg, however, has proposed a more tantalizing 
job description for the "monitoring" director: 
Under a monitoring model, ... the role of the board is to hold the 
executives accountable for adequate results (wll.ether financial, social, 
or both), while the role of the executives is to determine how to achieve 
such results. Of course, the board cannot perform this function with-
out regard to policy: objecµv~s must be set, explicitly or implicitly, 
against which to measure management's results, and the selection of 
objectives will partly depend on the directors' broad notions of 
policy .... 
The monitoring model, moreover, is not simply mechanistic; moni-
toring must begin with results, but it cannot end there. . . . The con-
cept of monitoring for results . . . does not preclude the monitors from 
going behind the result and either accepting as satisfactory a level of 
performance which falls short of the applicable objective, or criticizing 
as unsatisfactory a level of performance which exceeds it. What the 
concept of monitoring does require is the availability of sophisticated 
and independent information-gathering systems . . . and directors 
who are equally sophisticated in interpreting both financial and nonfi-
nancial data.247 
If the directors are to fix financial objectives, go "behind results," 
and plug into sophisticated and independent information-gathering 
systems in their role as monitors, then they will work quite hard. But 
not at what they do best. 
Some proponents of the monitoring model also have in mind the 
prevention of illegal corporate acts through directorial diligence. Al-
though preventing illegal acts is an important goal, Professor Coffee 
has ably demonstrated that the organizational obstacles to uncover-
ing these handiworks, largely of middle management, are awesome. 
It is one thing to make the obvious statement that independent direc-
tors must be adequately informed so as to be able to exercise their 
judgment, and another to place upon them the duty of reasonable 
diligence or ordinary care to ferret out information. If the latter is a 
correct summary of present law, then strong disincentives to service 
by truly independent directors exist. Firmly placing such a monitor-
ing duty on the independent directors would require them to devote 
part of their time to developing sophisticated and independent infor-
mation-gathering systems, a task at which they are not especially 
adept, to the detriment of the task at which they excel - making 
business decisions. Put to choices in the real world of time con-
straints, directors should be decision-makers not detectives.248 
247. M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 165-66 (1976) (footnote 
omitted). 
248. This is not to suggest that monitoring for illegality, a function loosely assigned today 
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The difference between the independent directors acting as "de-
ciders" or as "monitors" is one of degree. Both contemplate firing 
the chief executive when necessary. Both contemplate setting poli-
cies and objectives. Both contemplate perceptive evaluation of in-
formation, but they skew at a critical point: Should the independent 
directors spend most of their time gathering information or making 
business decisions? Directors should devote their available time to 
what the evidence shows they do best - making business decisions. 
Courts should require them to do this, within the limits of their time 
commitment as directors, and then protect them to the hilt. The 
monitoring movement has brought us the new board, but we should 
now seek to capitalize on the new situation. The law cannot off er 
strong protection to the independent directors for the business deci-
sion itself, but only uncertainty as to the information existing in the 
very large and complex organization that may later be held to have 
been quite relevant thereto. Ordinary negligence liability cannot be 
any part of a realistic formula for attracting independent directors, 
whether as monitors or deciders. And, requiring plaintiff to prove 
that the director's "negligent" inattentiveness caused the loss, as in 
.Barnes,249 is insufficient protection for the new board, now con-
trolled by the independents. There is still room for director liability 
for utter and reckless disregard of the duty to be informed. 
If the courts accept the "decider'' model, the chief executive will 
make fewer business decisions. What can the chief executive con-
structively do with the time that he might then have available for 
other tasks? The very things that some proponents of the monitoring 
model have suggested for the new board. Specifically, the chief exec-
utive should exercise due diligence in gathering accurate information 
about corporate activities. The chief must dip down a few levels in 
the hierarchy to counteract, to the extent possible, upward informa-
tion distortion. Monitoring the vast activities of the corporate giant 
is a job for the highly compensated chief executive, not the board. 
And the courts should require the chief executive to report this more 
accurate information to the board, or at least that information criti-
cal to business decisions by the new board and any information that 
the chief executive obtains regarding illegal activities. In other 
words, the legal liability for failure adequately to monitor and report 
on corporate activities, legal or illegal, should be squarely placed on 
the chief executive (and upon other res_l)onsible senior executives), 
to the audit committee, should be abrogated nor that directors should stick their heads in the 
sand. 
249. Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). 
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and unambiguously taken off the backs of truly independent board 
members. 
This tentative equation should increase the incentives for truly 
independent persons to serve as directors of large corporations, pro-
vided that the rates of directorial compensation are raised to realistic 
levels.250 Given the limited time that capable and independent di-
rectors can devote, the chief executive will still make most of the 
business decisions. But the board should decide and make explicit to 
the chief executive those categories of ded.sions that it will generally 
make, leaving either the unspecified balance or specified categories 
of decisions to the chief executive. Unless patently spurious, this de-
cision should be fully protected under the business judgment rule. 
However, the deciding model would not tolerate the "pro forma" or 
blanket delegation of all major decisions to the chief exe.cutive, even 
though that has apparently sufficed to protect directors under present 
law.2s1 
The law could promote the directorial decision model by exploit-
ing the present ambiguities in the applicability of the business judg-
ment rule to decisions made by corporate officers as such. Under the 
influence of the older legal model that directors "manage," the 
courts articulated the business judgment rule in terms of protecting 
directors from liability as directors for decisions reached by the 
board. In the past, top management comprised a majority of the 
board. Since the "board" ( or at least a majority thereof) had the 
same information that top management had, the courts had no com-
pelling need to encourage top management to convey information to 
the board. The officers, in their status as directors, received the pro-
tection of the rule for any decision that they chose to make or have 
rubber-stamped at the board level. Today, the boards of substan-
tially all the largest corporations consist of a majority of nonmanage-
ment directors. The courts can restrict the business judgment rule to 
those decisions that are (1) actually macle at the board level (!.e., by 
directors acting as such); (2) explicitly delegated by the board to the 
chief executive; and (3) in the overlap or gray area and are made by 
the chief executive after meaningful consultation with the board.252 
250. See note 41 supra. 
251. See Kelly v. Bell, 254 A.2d 62, 72 (Del. Ch. 1969), a.ffd., 266 A.2d 878 (Del. 1970); W. 
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The courts may not have to manipulate the business judgment 
rule to impose informational duties upon senior management and 
confer informational rights upon the new board. Instead, they can 
revitalize the hornbook law of agency as to the relationship between 
the board, as principal and employer, and the chief executive, as 
agent and employee. Agency law applies not only to the external 
acts of the chief executive and others, its most common application, 
but also to the corporation's internal affairs. The officers, as agents, 
have clear duties to the board, as principal. Seavey's Hornbook on 
Agency confirms an agent's duties to convey information to, and to 
obey, the principal: 
An agent who acquires information relevant to matters within his 
province and of which he should know the principal would want to 
know, has a duty to reveal it . . . . 
... [A]n agent has a duty to act only in accordance with what he 
reasonably believes the principal has directed or, if he knew the facts, 
would direct the agent to do at the time and place of action. 253 
And, the agent must be duly diligent and act with ordinary care.254 
The new board could sue the officers in a direct corporate action 
for violating their informational and ordinary care duties. Although 
the new board is not likely to do so (unless it is prepared to dismiss 
the chief executive at the same time), the shareholders could sue the 
chief executive and other responsible senior executives derivatively 
for a clear violation that caused corporate damage and that the new 
board failed to pursue. A pattern of repeated and knowing failure 
by the new board to pursue such claims against, or to discipline or to 
fire, the chief executive might well constitute "gross negligence plus 
more," rendering the board liable.255 This narrow exception aside, 
the courts should fully protect the independent directors from share-
holders' derivative suits when key officers have violated their inf or-
mational duties to the board. 
Since the key officers of the largest corporations are today's 
citing Kelly v. Bell for the proposition that "the decision of the executive officers may also 
come within the [Business Judgment] Rule," preferred to base its decision on grounds other 
than "the broad cutting edge of the Rule," and held, in the process, against management. 
Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d ll9, 124-25 (Del. Ch. 1971). 
253. W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY §§ 143, 145 (1964), 
254. See id at § 40, at 235-36; H. HENN, Stlpra note 57, at § 219, at 432, § 234, at 456: 
''Unlike directors, who, ... areStJi generis, officers are agents of the corporation, and, as such, 
subject to the usual principles of agency law, including the fiduciary duties of agents. 
. . . If officers, agents, or employees violate their duties to the corporation, they are, of 
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255. See text at notes 49-59 Stlpra. 
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"deep pockets," the imposition of this duty upon them, coupled with 
the elimination of independent directors as potential contributors to 
any damage judgment, should strongly encourage the flow of critical 
information to the board. Although fewer defendants will be avail-: 
able for paying any judgment, the prime purpose of the stockholder's 
derivative suit, as Professors Coffee and Schwartz recently argued, 
should be deterrence rather than compensation.256 · And, because 
these key officers receive very large compensation payments, the im-
position of the duty should not create strong disincentives for able 
persons to serve as officers. 
These suggestions are not intended to turri corporate decision-
making topsy turvy. As to the informational duties suggested, the 
courts should define information "critical" to major board decisions 
narrowly and cautiously to permit today's trends in the corporate 
establishment to continue to evolve slowly and intelligently. As to 
the suggested allocation of decision-making, many chief executives 
will welcome the opportunity to pass the buck to the new bo~rd on 
certain stressful decisions, 257 drawing both legal and organizational 
comfort from the process. And the new board would not be placed 
in the position of having to overrule or criticize the chief executive, 
nor will the latter be organizationally embarassed by participating 
with peers as a business decision-maker. · 
CONCLUSION 
The independent directors are looking, in this new era, for a way 
to structure the "interval of time" that they have committed to a task 
that, as yet, has no precise job description. Corporate law could be a 
powerful influence during this period of flux. The courts should cau-,-
tiously mold this vast resource of directorial talent, integrity, and 
high motivation toward its highest and best use - business decision-
making. · 
256. See Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 49, at 302-09. 
257. See note 214 supra. 
